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Но дружбы нет и той меж нами. 
Все предрассудки истребя, 
Мы почитаем всех нулями, 
А единицами — себя. 
Мы все глядим в Наполеоны; 
Двуногих тварей миллионы 
Для нас орудие одно; 
Нам чувство дико и смешно. 
 
But even friendships like our heroes’ 
Exist no more; for we’ve outgrown 
All sentiments and deem men zeroes— 
Except of course ourselves alone.  
We all take on Napoleon’s features, 
And millions of our fellow creatures 
Are nothing more to us than tools…. 
Since feelings are for freaks and fools. 
 
-Alexander Pushkin 
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i 
Preface 
 
History is often an admittedly bleak subject. When historians do their work best, they try to 
find a retrospective justice for an unjust past. Even as citizens of the present, we comfort ourselves 
with the knowledge that the powerful and corrupt today cannot escape the judgement of history 
tomorrow. In the course of this project, I have found every reason to believe this is often not true, 
that history reflects the biases of power more than it challenges them. Additionally, there is a kind of 
separateness to the past a historian sees which oftentimes softens their judgemental blows. Trouillot 
notes this when he writes that “The more historians wrote about past worlds, the more The Past 
became real as a separate world.”  The trouble is that the past is not a separate world. We live in a 1
world built on the past and which, with every second, slips deeper into it. Walter Benjamin noted 
that history’s site “is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now.”  If 2
we, as historians, treat history as empty time we not only drive ourselves into irrelevance, but we 
ignore the presence in the past.  
Given this, it is right that we judge the past not only as historians, but as ordinary people. 
When figures such as my subjects, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, are raised to a pedestal which 
no judgement seems to shrink, historians cannot fight this by further entrenching the past as a 
separate world. Our judgement of these figures should not only be intelligent and considered, but 
humorous and demythologizing. These are daily figures in our lives, whether we like it or not, and 
we should treat them as such, with all the expectations and vernacular we would direct against 
figures of the present. Just as some poor and embittered Virginian sitting in a pub would curse them, 
so should we. They were, in no uncertain terms, ​greedy bastards​, and we live in the world they created.  
To understand our world, we cannot live in a world of ‘great but deeply flawed visionaries’ 
or ‘enlightened but imperfect revolutionaries’ or even a world of ‘founding fathers.’ To understand 
our world and grapple with our past, we need to live in a world of greedy bastards. This is not only 
because they were bastards, but because the bastards of our present gain their legitimacy from those 
of our past. The bite of judgement on past and present oppressors is softened by any mention of 
‘visionaries,’ ‘revolutionaries,’ or ‘fathers.’ Historians love complexity, but for figures such as these 
there are no mixed legacies, for any positives will almost always be taken as outweighing the 
negatives. This does not mean historians need to take up their hatchets at the cost of ignoring the 
past, but it does mean they should not be timid in judgement because these bastards were not timid 
in their crimes.  
Perhaps one day children will open their textbooks to the ‘Greedy Bastards’ section. On that 
day the tables will have turned and an admirable lens on these individuals will go against the grain, 
but until then we have a duty to push against the narrative of the powerful that continues to 
structure our world. Given that history is all that remains of us after we die, I think the best world 
we can create is one where the powerful live their lives in fear of being remembered as greedy 
bastards. This is the presence in the past and we must fight to make it just.  
 
 
 
1Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 152.  
2Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in ​Illuminations​, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, (New 
York: Schocken Books, 1968), 261.  
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Introduction-Condemn the Bastards  
 
 
“Silences are inherent in history because any single event enters history with some of its constituting parts 
missing. Something is always left out while something else is recorded….In other words, the very mechanisms that 
make any historical recording possible also ensure that historical facts are not created equal.”  3
-Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
 
If Trouillot is right, as I believe he is, then just as single events enter history with pieces 
missing, some events undergo a breadth of historical investigation in comparison to others, which 
are consigned to the purgatory of the unimportant. When scholars look at the ‘founding fathers’ and 
their relationships with republican projects outside the United States, they focus predominantly on 
the trans-Atlantic exchange between the United States and revolutionary France.  This focus is partly 4
structural: these figures routinely travelled to France, exchanged letters with a variety of French 
notables,  and in their own writing portrayed the early period of the French revolution as a glorious 5
continuation of their own republican moment. While these are understandable reasons, they also 
lead history to mimic the biases of its subjects. We see the importance of republican France like the 
founding fathers saw it. Or maybe, we see history like the founding fathers wanted us to see it. In 
short, this historical focus is a silence like any other silence. Something is left out and something else 
is recorded.  
Left out are the revolutions which shaped the American world and, in previously overlooked 
ways, the very idea of republican government. While the old-world revolution in France played to 
the founding fathers’ hopes—that the ‘enlightenment’ they discovered could spread across the ocean 
to their ancestral continent—its failure sparked new-world revolutions that challenged their 
3Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 49. 
4 Although there has been work to diversify this focus. Brandon Mills’ “‘The United States of Africa’: Liberian 
Independence and the Contested Meaning of a Black Republic” is one example.  
5Indeed, even when shifting one’s historical focus, one often has to rely on these same letters as, despite my shift to 
Latin America, I rely on letters to Lafayette and Roland.  
 
 
2 
ideology. Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula and the resulting collapse of the previously 
effective Spanish colonial system led to a wave of Latin American revolutions for both 
independence and, in many cases, representative government. The French revolution had, years 
earlier, been a far away cause for everyday Americans, but these new revolutions occurred in their 
own hemisphere and, as a result, shared many of the same challenges. Beyond the combination of 
independence and representative government,  Latin American revolutionaries faced a similar 6
context to that of the United States because they possessed a colonial history, an active slave 
economy, populations that were indigenous, African, and European, and lived next to large swaths 
of land that were often seen as ‘free’ for expansion. When the founding fathers looked East, they 
saw a European revolution but when they looked South they were confronted with an American 
one. These situational similarities drive one shift of this project, away from an investigation of the 
founding fathers’ reactions to the French revolution toward an investigation of their thoughts on 
Latin American revolutions.  7
This shift drives this project largely because of one letter. Writing to Alexander Von 
Humboldt in 1814, Jefferson discussed what he thought about the prospects for republicanism in 
Latin America and the shape of the American hemisphere he hoped would emerge from this 
moment. Already interested in the later-life retrospective thoughts of founding figures on the 
governments they created, this letter was striking because Jefferson was not only implicitly 
expounding on his earlier ideas about the meaning of republicanism, but was engaging with its future 
6A combination which, in and of itself, merits the hemispheric investigation. 
7As such, while scholars such as Patrice Higonnet in ​Sister Republics: the Origins of French and American Republicanism​, James 
Kloppenberg in ​Toward Democracy​, and Susan Dunn in ​Sister Revolutions: French Lightning, American Light​ have focused on 
the trans-Atlantic republican interaction, and while this project draws on the founders’ experience with the French 
Revolution in order to better contextualize their views on Latin America, this East-West dialogue is not the focus of this 
project.  
 
 
3 
outside of his direct control. The letter, not prominently cited in most analyses of Jefferson’s 
thought, shifted my focus to the moment of Latin American revolution. In effect, it showed me a 
silence which hid not only a significant historical moment, but a potential reconceptualization of 
republicanism itself.  
However, this is not the only silence this project attempts to confront. The American 
mythology exerts a great deal of power over the historiographic process, particularly the mythology 
surrounding the ‘founding moment.’ In this historical rendering, the 1787 constitutional convention 
was a moment of ‘pure creation’ in which not only was the structure of the U.S. government created, 
but so too were the core tenets of U.S. republicanism in connection, of course, to the Declaration of 
Independence.  Although the United States would evolve over time, this core ideology would remain 8
set in stone. This historical interpretation ignores a critical fact: those founders proceeded to govern 
the United States for the next thirty eight years. When history creates such a clear line between the 
founding and the early republic, it facilitates an overly rosy picture of U.S. republicanism by 
restricting its view only to doctrinal republicanism—the version put forward in words by the 
founders—which leads to ignorance of republicanism as an implemented practice and theory of rule. 
In essence, this periodic division treats the founders only as republican thinkers, when in fact they 
translated those thoughts into action and, in so doing, continued to expand, retract, and cement 
their republican ideology. To understand the true nature of U.S. republicanism, the period that 
counts as ‘the founding’ must be extended. As Gordon Wood notes, this early republican period is 
too often silenced by the founding that preceded it and the early national period that came after it.  9
8 Scholars that focus on this founding moment and the conceptual origins of republicanism include Gordon Wood 
(especially his book ​The Creation of the American Republic​) and J.G.A. Pockock. This project, however, focuses on the post 
1800 period in order to understand this republicanism better by investigating its realization through action.  
9Gordon Wood, “The Significance of the Early Republic,” ​Journal of the Early Republic 8​, no. 1 (1988): 5.   
 
 
4 
In fact, this early republican period not only further defined the republican ideology, but, even more 
importantly, defined it in the post-1815 moment where the U.S. was no longer a recently-liberated 
colony. What this republicanism meant to its founders when it was combined with the growth of 
U.S. power is a crucial question. In the moment of Latin American revolution we not only see the 
question of republicanism, but also the question of what an increasingly influential United States 
would do about it? Hence, the focal puzzle of this project surrounds what the founding fathers 
thought about the potential for representative government  in Latin America. What new picture of 10
U.S. republicanism emerges when the investigative lens is shifted to focus on this North-South 
republican dialogue in the early republican period?  
In answering this question, this project draws heavily on historians writing broader histories, 
namely Arthur Whitaker and his ​The United States and the Independence of Latin America 1800-1830. 
Although these works provide many of the facts this project will draw on, its focus will be much 
more narrow and its interpretive position will differ from many of these authors. Similarly, the 
diplomatic history of this period  is relevant context for this project because the founders were 11
situated in a world rife with diplomatic concerns and many of these concerns influenced their views 
on Latin American republicanism. This project, however, shifts the focus onto how this diplomacy 
was relevant to their imaginations of representative government in Latin America, rather than 
focusing on the diplomacy itself. For example, Stephen Chambers’ book ​No God But Gain: The Untold 
10A quick note: the term “republicanism” has been much debated in political science literature but in this project it will 
be largely used to denote a government structured around the election of representative leaders, interchangeable with 
“representative government.” In this schema, republicanism also denotes a system in which the public good is prioritized 
over the private interest. This is to mirror the founders’ own usage. 
11 Including, but not limited to: James Lewis-​The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood​, Don Coerver and Linda 
Hall-​Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States​, Charles Griffin-​The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish 
Empire 1810-1822​, Alonso Aguilar-​Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present,​ Harry Bernstein-​Origins of Inter-American 
Interest 1700-1812​, Jay Sexton-​The Monroe Doctrine:Empire and Nation in Nineteenth Century America​, and a variety of other 
works.  
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Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Making of the United States​ provides a useful historical 
retelling of the Monroe Doctrine but does not discuss the connection between this doctrine and 
republicanism, which is the focus of this project. The investigation of political culture by historians 
like Caitlin Fitz in her ​Our Sister Republics​ is critical for understanding the period, but this project 
focuses on the founders themselves due to their position in the national mythology and their 
connection to the ‘principles’ of the United States. In the same way, a great deal of scholarship looks 
into the the positions of U.S. politicians on the question of Latin American independence and 
representative government, however much of this literature focuses on figures who were not central 
to the founding of the U.S. republic, such as Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams. Although 
important figures in the history of this period, this project focuses on the founding fathers 
themselves in order to question the fundamental vision of U.S. republicanism.  
This focus is limited to Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe for a variety of reasons. Holding 
power from the very start of the revolutions until their general success, these persons had the 
greatest ability to engage with the questions these revolutions raised. Additionally, given that 
Jefferson exited office as these revolutions were just getting of the ground, the general 
correspondence between these individuals even after their retirements provides a crucial area of 
investigation. These figures were a part of the same social class of Virginia Plantation owners, they 
all owned slaves, they were close friends and mentors to each other, and, perhaps because of these 
factors and as this project will show, they were engaged in a collective twenty four year project to 
define the future of the United States.  Finally, these were some of the figures most integral to the 12
formation of the U.S. republican identity and the American creedal narrative.   13
12 When I refer to the “Virginia Dynasty,” I refer to these three individuals.  
13 This is the case because Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, Madison’s influence over the constitutional design, 
and Monroe’s Doctrine and its influence provide the foundations for this version of history. 
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This creedal narrative is precisely what this project seeks to push against, following in the 
footsteps of scholars such as Aziz Rana. Rana writes that as a consequence of understanding the 
United States in “civic rather than white settler terms”  “today’s vision of the country as 14
intrinsically—if incompletely—liberal systemically deemphasizes those forms of economic and 
political subordination that continue to mark the experience of historically marginalized 
communities.”  He labels this “anticolonial, liberatory, and egalitarian” story the “American creedal 15
narrative.”  This narrative smooths over various aspects of history as ‘imperfections’ in an 16
otherwise pure ideology  and remains pervasive throughout historical writing. Gunnar Myrdal and 17
his ​An American Dilemma ​helped codify the concept and scholars such as James Kloppenberg in his 
Toward Democracy​ further it. Outside the academy, the narrative may be found in the speeches and 
writings of President Obama in addition to most U.S. history textbooks. This influence is 
unfortunate because, as Trouillot would say, this narrative silences and it is this silence that this 
project attempts to confront. What story emerges when we stop engaging in this creedal narrative 
and search for a new view of United States history? 
This story is found through the connection with Latin America. While the creedal narrative 
holds the universality of republicanism as a core tenet, the approaches of Jefferson, Madison, and 
Monroe to the Latin American revolutions of independence reveal that this tenet was, rather than 
imperfectly applied, nonexistent. Instead of this universality guiding a robust support of Latin 
American republicanism, this ‘universal’ republicanism was itself structured around the self-interest 
14Allegra McLeod, “Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage,” ​The Supreme Court Review 2016, 
no. 1 (2017): 182.  
15Aziz Rana, “Colonialism and Constitutional Memory,” ​UC Irvine Law Review 5, ​no. 2 (2015): 268.  
16Allegra McLeod, “Police Violence, Constitutional Complicity, and Another Vantage,” ​The Supreme Court Review 2016, 
no. 1 (2017): 182.  
17For example, the existence of slavery and its inequalities were an aberration from the founding egalitarian philosophy, 
rather than that philosophy having inequalities written into its core.  
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of the United States and especially around the Virginia Dynasty’s collective project of U.S. territorial 
expansion. This expansionist project is addressed most directly in the third chapter, in which the 
creation and rationale of the Monroe Doctrine are analyzed. However, before putting forward his 
doctrine Monroe wrote to Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to ask their advice and so in order 
to fully connect the Monroe Doctrine to the conception of republicanism that undergirds it, the 
thoughts of both these figures on Latin American revolutions are analyzed in the first two chapters 
of this project. These chapters are unified by an approach that places diverse letters across many 
years in conversation so that a picture of the later-life republican vision of these figures may be 
developed. Given the nature of these letters, a synthetic approach is required to contextualize and 
extrapolate this picture from the varied and oftentimes elusive references to Latin American 
revolutions. This picture was translated into action in the Monroe Doctrine, and so the letters and 
the doctrine reflect on each other and both contribute to the continued evolution of the meaning of 
founding republicanism.  This historical moment is used to critique the American creedal narrative. 
Rather than utilizing that moment to support the republican cause, the previously revealed 
preference for a self-interested, slave based, and territorially expansive vision of republicanism is 
realized in this foundational moment of foreign policy. This realization is then connected to the 
American project more broadly. With its core largely centered around self-interested territorial 
expansion, and with the actions of the founders surrounding republican Latin America centering 
around the same, the American creedal narrative is firmly called into question.  
Ironically, to disprove the creedal narrative you must first reject it. This is why silences are so 
insidious: you do not find them unless you are looking but once you see them, they are everywhere. 
Aziz Rana’s critique of the creedal narrative was highlighted in a Supreme Court Law Review 
 
 
8 
because the constitutionalism and the constitutional originalism that guide the court are founded on 
this creedal narrative. Open up any history textbook about the United States, and odds are one will 
find the creedal narrative and the silences that come with it. Stories of U.S. support for France will 
abound while the foundations for two centuries of U.S. exploitation in Latin America will remain 
absent. This creedal narrative forms the basis for the U.S. political system and its national 
mythology. While each disturbing fact about a founding father is levied against this narrative, they 
are often not placed within a narrative whole. Trouillot writes that his project of unearthing 
“required extra labor not so much in the production of new facts but in their transformation into a 
new narrative.”  This project attempts to take already-found letters and use them to weave a new 18
American narrative.  
This new narrative offers several contributions. First, it highlights the early foundations for 
U.S. imperialism in Latin America. This narrative also deepens the analysis of other scholars about 
the centrality of slavery and territorial expansion to the identity and history of the United States. 
Additionally, this project critiques the apotheosis of these figures in American political culture. 
Finally, the core mythology of the United States is challenged and the implications of this for future 
historical work are extrapolated. At stake is no less than our sense of what the United States means, 
what stories we tell our children,  and how we think about our collective responsibility.  19
This responsibility is at the heart of my interest in this topic. Growing up in the midst of 
domestic and international crises, some existential in character, the world seemed hopeless. As a 
younger person, I thought the problem was one of generational differences; I now know that it is 
more complicated. Our country is built on myths. This is what Ernest Renan meant when he said 
18Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 58. 
19Rogers Smith, ​Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership ​(Cambridge: The Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 
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that “Getting history wrong is part of being a nation.”  But these myths have led us astray. How we 20
have been getting history wrong makes us believe that this country is built upon principles rather 
than selfishness, egalitarianism rather than exploitation, cosmopolitanism rather than imperialism. 
We are now in a moment when, as the oppressive legacies of our history have gained more potency, 
these disconnects have matured into social rifts and, should we continue to hold on to the myths of 
our forebears, they will tear us apart. To build a new world we need a new story, and in my mind it is 
better that this story be truth rather than myth.  
The truth is that the men who founded the United States were arrogant, selfish, greedy 
bastards. Where they saw the opportunity for gain, they took it and structured their principles to 
justify their actions. These principles are core to our old mythology, and their infallibility must be 
torn down if we are to have new stories and, through them, a new world. This moment of Latin 
American revolutions, of Monroe and his doctrine, of an extended founding, is one in which this 
truth can be highlighted. As long as we look to these bastards with pride, none of our issues can 
truly be solved. Their history is one we should be ashamed of, which is good not because of its 
existence, but because this shame might motivate us to make right the harms of our past. Pride in 
these ‘founding fathers’ and their principles have certainly not provided this motivation; rather, it 
has rendered us blind to the injustices of the present and their historical roots.  
This is why historians must render judgement and condemn the bastards of the past rather 
than apologize for them. Hopelessness and its causes can only be fought if we accept the dark and 
disenchanting history that drives them. This acceptance does not result in a comforting story, but I 
think, or at least I hope, that it might result in a better world. Trouillot ends his book writing “we 
20Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation,” (conference, Paris, France, 11 March 1882).  
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may want to keep in mind that deeds and words are not as distinguishable as we often presume. 
History does not belong only to its narrators, professional or amateur. While some of us debate 
what history is or was, others take it in their own hands.”  With each of their words the founders 21
enacted a deed: creating a narrative that we have yet to escape, silences that go unnoticed, moral 
responsibilities that are still avoided. This is the history I attempt to take into my own hands. I can 
only hope I will do justice to all who have a stake in it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 153. 
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Chapter I-Jefferson 
 
Thomas Jefferson was a man best known for the principles he helped codify in the 
Declaration of Independence, however an examination of his retirement letters about Latin 
American revolutions reveals that these principles were structured around the self-interest of the 
United States. Territorial expansion and slavery, rather than a faith in representative government, 
drove how Jefferson thought about republicanism in Latin America.  
* * * 
 Jefferson’s Perspective 
As Thomas Jefferson’s presidency was ending and he was preparing to enter his retirement, 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula sparked the Latin American wars of 
independence. The uprisings in Latin America began in earnest around 1809; by then Jefferson had 
exited the presidency in March.  Jefferson looked forward to his retirement for a long time and, as 22
such, sought to exit public life.  However, throughout his retirement Jefferson continued to 23
exchange letters with his foreign and domestic acquaintances, namely Madison and Monroe who, 
due to their positions as the following Presidents, were forced to confront the issue of Latin 
American independence. These letters continue to highlight Jefferson’s political thoughts after his 
political career. Latin American independence and the prospect of a free Western hemisphere 
attracted his most direct re-foray into the political realm. Having heard from then President James 
Monroe of George Canning’s proposal for a joint-British and American guarantee of Latin 
American independence from European interference, Jefferson wrote: 
22Marcelo Borges, “Independence in Latin America-A Chronology,” Dickinson College​, ​accessed 4 December 2017, 
http://users.dickinson.edu/~borges/chronologyindep.htm​.  
23Joseph Ellis, ​American Sphinx ​(New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 137.  
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I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any 
interest in them, that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions on them worthy of 
any attention. But the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects 
so decisive of our future destinies, as to rekindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on 
such occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions.  24
 
By his own admission Jefferson was an apolitical individual, or at the very least sought to be. The 
question of Canning’s proposal, a proposal which lead to the Monroe doctrine and one which was 
impossible without the independence of Latin America, pulled Jefferson out of his apoliticism. For 
Jefferson, the independence of Latin America would be “decisive of our future destinies” and this fit 
into his overall imagination of the effects representative government would have on the world. 
Given that he saw this topic as enormously important, an investigation of his thoughts on the 
subject is clearly merited.  
As this and the following section will make clear, Jefferson’s views on republicanism in Latin 
America were founded not only on his prejudice towards Spanish colonial populations, but also on 
the self-interest of the United States and concerns about slavery. Because these foundations are 
subtextual, Jefferson’s writings must be thoroughly scoured and compared in order to develop this 
picture. This section will highlight the relevant aspects of Jefferson’s identity while the next section 
will use this information to develop a picture of Jefferson’s thoughts on representative government 
in Latin America.  
It is well known that, writing to Madison in 1809, Jefferson imagined the creation of an 
“empire of liberty”  by including Canada in the United States. However, this was somewhat of an 25
understatement. Writing to Albert Gallatin fourteen years later, Jefferson declared that the advance 
24Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823,​ ​letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ​ed. 
Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1481-1485. 
25Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 26 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm022316/. 
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of representative government “everywhere in a more or less perfect form….will insure the 
amelioration of the condition of the world. It will cost years of blood, and be well worth them.”  26
Representative government was not only an ideal system of governance for Jefferson, its 
implementation over the course of history was the grand solution to the world’s problems. 
Jefferson also approached the world from a specific background outside of his faith in the 
prospects of representative government. As scholars such as Caitlin Fitz and Joseph Ellis note, 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence defined the principles behind the American revolution;  27
no wonder Jefferson held the principle of representative government in such high esteem, he helped 
monumentalize it both on paper and in the North American cultural consciousness. However 
Jefferson was not simply a founding father, he was also a part of the Virginia plantation class and, as 
such, a slave owner. With the King of Haiti Henry I supporting Bolivar’s efforts and with 
emancipation becoming an ever more dominant theme in the Latin American wars of independence, 
Jefferson’s position on this issue is crucial to keep in mind. Additionally, Jefferson’s political 
philosophy was deeply rooted in his vision of an American republicanism founded on agrarianism. 
Writing to William Short Jefferson said that, contrary to Europe where wars were necessary to 
counter overpopulation, in America “room is abundant, population scanty, and peace the necessary 
means for producing men, to whom the redundant soil is offering the means of life and happiness.”
 This principle, he goes on to note, applies to both Americas which ought to preserve peace by 28
26 Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 2 August 1823, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12​, ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​299-300.  
27 Joseph Ellis, “Prologue: Jeffersonian Surge: America, 1992-93,” in ​American Sphinx ​(New York: Vintage Books, 1998): 
3-27.; Caitlin Fitz, “An Imaginary Kindred,” in ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016): 
194-240. 
28Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 4 August 1820, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 4 December 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib021107/.  
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avoiding the wars in Europe.  When Jefferson imagines an agrarian future, it is present throughout 29
the entire hemisphere. Important to remember is that this agrarian future came at the cost of grave 
and genocidal consequences for the native inhabitants of the Americas. Jefferson’s thoughts on 
representation and agrarian equality must be considered in conjunction with his opinions regarding 
enslaved and native persons in order for a complete portrait to guide an analysis of his views on 
Latin America.  
Also important to consider is that this was not the first foreign revolution Jefferson 
witnessed. Jefferson watched the French revolution with initial enthusiasm, only to witness its failure 
with the reign of terror and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. Writing to Sir John Sinclair Jefferson 
voiced his worries about “the position in which Great Britain is placed, and [we, America] should be 
sincerely afflicted were any disaster to deprive mankind of the benefit of such a bulwark [Britain] 
against the torrent which has for some time been bearing down all before it.”  He voiced a similar 30
opinion to the Earl of Buchan, going so far as to “bless the almighty being who in gathering 
together the waters under the heavens into one place, divided the drylands of your hemisphere, from 
the dry lands of ours, and said, ‘here, at least, be there peace.’” ,  Watching Napoleon’s military 31 32
conquests in Europe, Jefferson was both grateful for the distance the United States benefited from 
and worried about possible British failure to stop Napoleonic expansion and the implications this 
would have for America.  
29Ibid.  
30Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Sir John Sinclair, 30 June 1803,​ ​letter printed in ​The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
Vol. 40, ​ed. Barbara Oberg​ ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 637-638. 
31Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1803,​ ​letter printed in ​The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
Vol. 40​, ed. Barbara Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 708-710. 
32The ironic and semi-gloating character of these comments should not be missed.  
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The French revolution also touched Jefferson more personally. Jefferson lamented to Pierre 
Jean Georges Cabanis “How many excellent friends have we lost in your efforts towards 
self-government, et cui bono?”  Jefferson had lost friends in the French revolution, many of whom 33
he had presumably interacted with during his time as envoy to France  and who, given previous 34
French support of the United States, had played a role in the U.S. revolutionary process. It was not 
solely his French colleagues who suffered; Thomas Paine himself was imprisoned and marked for 
execution during the revolution.  Not only had Jefferson watched a revolution he hoped would lead 35
to a free and representative France descend into an Empire that encroached on the wellbeing of the 
U.S., but it had taken the lives of his friends for, as he notes in Latin, “whose benefit?”   36
If these were the indirect aspects of Jefferson’s identity and experience informing his 
perspective on Latin America, he also had experience with the prospect of Latin American 
revolution during his political tenure. In 1805 the revolutionary Francisco de Miranda traveled 
throughout the United State to outfit and recruit for his effort to liberate what is now Venezuela 
from Spanish control.  Although his effort was thwarted by the Spanish coast guard,  the United 37 38
States with Jefferson as its president still found itself in the sensitive position of having its weapons 
and citizens on board Miranda’s ships. In his 1806 message to Congress, Jefferson outlined a 
situation in which the Spanish and United States’ commanders withdrew their forces to either side 
of the Sabine river, marking that as a “temporary line of separation….until the issue of our 
33Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 13 July 1803​, ​letter printed in ​The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson Vol. 41​, ed. Barbara Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 42-43. 
34Joseph Ellis, “Paris: 1784-89,” in ​American Sphinx ​(New York: Vintage Books, 1998): 75-139. 
35 ​Kevin Duong, Senior Project Meeting with Author.  
36“What is Cui Bono,” ​The Law Dictionary​, accessed 4 December 2017, ​https://thelawdictionary.org/cui-bono/​.  
37 Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016) 24-26. 
38 Ibid. 
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negotiations shall be known.”  Jefferson then went on to highlight his “measures for preventing and 39
suppressing this [Miranda’s] enterprise….and for arresting and bringing to justice its authors and 
abettors.”  The positioning of this passage right after his description of a Spanish-U.S. territorial 40
dispute indicates that Jefferson’s efforts to suppress the Miranda expedition, and his highlighting of 
them, were intimately connected to the territorial negotiations and maintenance of peace between 
the United States and Spain.  While in office Jefferson valued peace with Spain and the United 41
States’ territorial success over the questionable prospects of a startup revolutionary. He also frowned 
upon U.S. citizens’ support for Miranda, clearly defining that it was not their role “to decide for their 
country the question of peace or war, by commencing active and unauthorized hostilities.”  42
Jefferson’s previous experience with the prospect of Latin American revolution was decidedly 
slanted toward U.S. neutrality and the suppression of attempts at private U.S. involvement.  
After he left office Jefferson’s sources of information about events in Latin America began 
to wither. Writing to Madison in 1809, just after leaving the Presidency, Jefferson stated that he read 
the newspapers very little and that he was extraordinarily skeptical of what he did read.  However 43
Caitlin Fitz in ​Our Sister Republics ​outlines, in remarkable detail, how news about the occurrences in 
Latin America came from merchants, revolutionary agents, and Spanish imperial officials who, after 
landing in the United States, went to newspaper printing presses and related what they knew about 
the revolutions, or at the very least what they wanted people to hear. These news clips would then 
39Ibid. 
40Thomas Jefferson, Draft of Message to Congress, 2 December 1806, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 4 December 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib016629/.  
41Indeed, in his notes on the speech Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin commented that a passage requesting 
additional powers to suppress such enterprises, and the connection of that issue to the Miranda situation, should be 
moved and made more prominent.  
42Ibid. 
43Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 19 April 1809, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​106-107.  
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be reprinted in other papers across the country.  This, at least in Fitz’s concepcion, is how people 44
found out about the events of the southern revolutions. Given his limited exposure to newspapers, 
it is fair to assume that Jefferson was less informed on a variety of aspects and issues surrounding 
these revolutions, getting his news largely from those who wrote to him and only then when the 
information was deemed personally interesting in some fashion. This makes Jefferson an unusual 
candidate of study, in contrast to Madison and Monroe who were still involved in politics.  
Jefferson did have one good source of news aside from his letters: those who paid him a 
visit, usually at Monticello. In 1809 Francisco de Miranda met with Jefferson although he still 
refused to support Miranda’s cause.  For general knowledge about Latin America, Jefferson was 45
largely reliant on his visitors as well as on the writings of Alexander von Humboldt, a German 
philosopher and naturalist who traveled throughout South America.  Jefferson was later visited by a 46
Mr. Miralla from Buenos Aires who carried with him news of the Cuban position towards 
independence.  Jefferson, therefore, had no personal experience in Latin America and his 47
engagement with the public discourse surrounding the issue was sparse. He was almost totally reliant 
on the personal information provided by others. This made him prone to mirroring the assumptions 
of those around him. In his analysis of Jefferson’s position with regards to Spanish America, Zolán 
Vajda notes that the positions of  Jefferson and those around him oftentimes fell into an “image of 
Spain as a despotic power and Roman Catholicism as an institution entangled with it.”  Vajda goes 48
44Caitlin Fitz, “The News, in Black and White,,” in ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 
2016): 80-116.. 
45Zoltán Vadja, “Thomas Jefferson on the Character of an Unfree People: The Case of Spanish America,” ​American 
Nineteenth Century History 8​, no. 3 (2007): 275. 
46Ibid. 
47Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 23 June 1823, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12​ , ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​296-298.  
48Zoltán Vadja, “Thomas Jefferson on the Character of an Unfree People: The Case of Spanish America,” ​American 
Nineteenth Century History 8​, no. 3 (2007): 279. 
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on to connect this outlook to the Black Legend of Spanish cruelty in the Americas. Outside of 
following these views himself, Jefferson received much of his information from associates who 
would have fallen into similar if not identical biases.  
Jefferson’s perspective was, therefore, one defined not only by his political principles and 
faith in the ameliorative powers of representative government into the future, but also by his 
slave-ownership and agrarian philosophy dependent on the seizure of native land. He looked at 
these revolutions after having lost sleep and friends during the dramatic failure of French Revolution 
to live up to its promise. He disowned and attempted to prevent a previous revolutionary effort and 
received his information almost solely from acquaintances. However, now that the new revolutions 
were successful he would have to grapple with the reality of an independent Latin America. This was 
the man whose views and perspective the rest of this chapter will parse out and analyze.  
Prospects for Representative Government 
Jefferson’s core view about the future of representative government in Latin America was 
that the newly independent states were destined to fail in their efforts to establish free governments 
and, as a result, fall into military “despotism.”  In his letter to Anne Stael-Holstein Jefferson 49
outlined exactly how he imagines this will happen given the situation at the time. He wrote that “in 
all those countries the most inveterate divisions have arisen, partly among the different casts, partly 
among rival-leaders. Constitution after constitution is made and broken and in the meantime 
everything is at the mercy of the military leaders.”  Jefferson predicts military despotism largely 50
because of the divisions present within Latin American society and, due to the general lack of order, 
49Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt, 14 April 1811​, ​letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: 
Writings​, ed. Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1247-1248. 
50Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Anne L. G. N. Stael-Holstein, 6 September 1816, Manuscript/Mixed Material, 
retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 2 November 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib022570/.  
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assumes that the leaders of the military structures will seize control. While Jefferson references the 
contemporary situation to make this prediction, the reasons behind it are in fact much more 
structural and deeply rooted in Latin American society and history.  
The crux of why Jefferson thought military despotism was inevitable in the Latin American 
context was the state of education. In 1813 Jefferson wrote to Alexander von Humboldt that 
geographic region was characterized by the “lowest grade of ignorance” and writing to P.S. Dupont 
de Nemours, Jefferson declared that “the degrading ignorance into which their priests and kings 
have sunk them, has disqualified them from the maintenance or ​even the knowledge of their rights​ and 
that much blood may be shed for little improvement in their condition.”  For Jefferson, the 51
ignorance of the population is such that, even if the people had the power to institute free 
government over the opposition of other social forces, they would not know to do it because they 
were unaware of their rights: in essence, of what freedom is. This language is woven throughout 
dozens of Jefferson’s letters, though he does outline some possible exceptions. Having heard from 
Humboldt that Mexico is “not wanting” of “men of science”  he accepts a possibility that it “may 52
revolutionize itself under better auspices.”  He also, in a letter to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1817, 53
declares that “Brazil is more populous more wealthy, more energetic, and as wise as Portugal”  so 54
perhaps Brazil would be excluded from Jefferson’s destiny of despotism. Even with these differing 
cases, Jefferson’s view on the Latin American populace was centered on the concept of ignorance.  
51Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Dupont De Nemours, 15 April 1811, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11​, ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​196-204. (My emphasis) 
52Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt, 6 December 1813​, ​letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: 
Writings, ​ed. Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1311-1314. 
53 ​Ibid. 
54Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 14 May 1817, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​61-64.  
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Jefferson imagined the ignorance of the Latin American populace leading to despotic 
governments because of a maxim he describes to Lafayette. He declared it “one of the 
impossibilities of nature that ignorance should maintain itself free against cunning, where any 
government has once been admitted.”  This maxim leads to Jefferson’s questioning “How much 55
liberty can they bear without intoxication?”  Written into this question through the word 56
“intoxication” is a concern about the mob. The ignorance of the Latin American populace, in 
Jefferson’s mind, is clearly connected to the possibility for a drunken or crazed group of individuals 
to either seize power or cause general violence and mayhem. This concern was not entirely 
unfounded in past experience, especially considering examples such as Shays’ rebellion or the 
violence of the mob during the French Revolution. Here, Jefferson extends this intoxication to the 
entirety of the population, indicating the depth to which he was prejudiced against the ability of the 
Latin American people to govern and moderate themselves.  
Jefferson imagined the harmful manifestation of this ignorance specifically in connection to 
questions of government structure and leadership. This is why he declared it impossible for 
ignorance to maintain freedom in the face of “cunning” specifically when “any government has once 
been admitted.”  This maxim is found in his earlier letter to Von Humboldt in which, after his 57
questioning of liberty under intoxication, he went on to ask “Are their chiefs sufficiently enlightened 
to form a well-guarded government, and their people to watch their chiefs?”  Perhaps because of 58
55Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 30 November 1813, letter printed in ​The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​356-360.  
56Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt, 14 April 1811​, ​letter printed in Merrill Peterson, ed. 
Thomas Jefferson: Writings ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1248. 
57Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 30 November 1813, letter printed in Paul Ford, ed. 
The Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol 11​ (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​356-360.  
58Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt, 14 April 1811,​ ​letter printed in Merrill Peterson, ed. 
Thomas Jefferson: Writings ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1248. 
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his contribution to a rebellion against monarchical control, the problem of ignorance manifests itself 
most clearly in a fear of individual despotic rule. In this same letter Jefferson “imagine[s] they will 
copy our outlines of confederation and elective government” but that: 
Their greatest difficulty will be in the construction of the executive. I suspect that, regardless 
of the experiment of France and of the United States….they will begin with a directory, and 
when the unavoidable schisms in that kind of executive shall drive them to something else, 
their great question will come on whether to substitute an executive elective for years, for 
life, or an hereditary one. But unless instruction can be spread among them more rapidly 
than experience promises, despotism may come upon them before they are qualified to save 
the ground they will have gained.  59
 
Jefferson locates the effect of ignorance directly in the construction of the executive and his 
prediction is telling because he almost directly outlines the process through which the French 
Revolution fell apart, from directory to a despotic executive. Indeed Jefferson references the 
“experiment of France” in this passage, directly linking two revolutions quite different in their 
geographic locale and character. Even more telling is that Jefferson then asks whether Napoleon 
could secure the “independence of all the West India Islands.”    60
Here Jefferson’s analytical structure fits under what might be termed a post-Napoleonic 
anxiety. Jefferson references the exact process in which the French revolution fell apart, attaches 
that process to South America’s future, then references Napoleon in the same breath. His 
compositional process reveals the origin of his worries surrounding Latin America. Indeed, when 
writing to Lafayette in 1817, Jefferson declared that “they [‘our southern brethren’] will fall under 
military despotism, and become the murderous tools of the ambition of their respective 
Bonapartes.”  In his earlier letter to Stael-Holstein, Jefferson links “ignorance and bigotry” to the 61
59Ibid. 
60Ibid. 
61Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 14 May 1817, letter printed in Paul Ford, ed. ​The 
Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol 12​ (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​63. 
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end of “free government” in the region declaring that “it is excruciating to believe that all will end in 
military despotisms under the Bonapartes of their regions.”  The union between Jefferson’s 62
terminology and his vision for how the newly independent south will descend into despotism reveals 
that his perspective on Latin America was rooted in the experience of watching the French 
revolution collapse and in the fear that Bonaparte may break through the British levee and negatively 
impact the United States in more tangible ways.  
Indeed Jefferson’s analyses of what might have prevented despotism in France and what 
might prevent despotism in Latin America bear considerable similarities. In his 1803 letter to 
Cabanis, Jefferson stated that if Napoleon gave France “as great a portion of liberty as the opinions, 
habits, & character of the nation are prepared for, progressive preparation may fit you for 
progressive portions of that first of blessings, and you may in time attain what we erred in supposing 
could be hastily siesed & maintained.”  Fifteen years later Jefferson wrote to Adams about the 63
South American revolutions saying “I do believe it would be better for them to obtain freedom by 
degrees only; because that would bring on light and information, and qualify them to take charge of 
themselves understandingly”  while noting that in the interim they should be controlled because 64
peace must be kept. Jefferson’s ideas about the proper process for the institution of representative 
government in Latin America are nearly identical to his retrospective thoughts on what ought to 
have been done in France. In his 1817 letter to Lafayette, Jefferson outlined some of the reforms he 
imagines happening in this time, including the gathering of “experience, their emancipation from 
62Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Anne L. G. N. Stael-Holstein, 6 September 1816, Manuscript/Mixed Material, 
retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 2 November 2017,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib022570/.  
63Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 13 July 1803​, ​letter printed in Barbara Oberg, ed. 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Vol. 41 ​(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 42-43. 
64Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 17 May 1818, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​95-96. 
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their priests, and advancement in information.”  Jefferson imagines education, the experience of 65
externally moderated self government, and release from the influence of the Catholic church as 
being the major components required for representative government to function in Latin America. 
His focus on priests emerges out of his general view, spread across the breadth of his writing on the 
subject, that priests contribute to the ignorance and bigotry of the population. This, again as Vajda 
notes, goes back to the Black Legend and the Spanish colonial experience.  
These were Jefferson’s views, but their interrogation reveals the close relationship between 
the structure of these views and the self-interest of the United States. This self-interest manifests 
most clearly when, as will be shown, Jefferson’s views vary according to the possibility for U.S. 
territorial expansion. This expansionist focus is important to consider in connection to the Monroe 
Doctrine, a link which the third chapter of this project will draw.  
Vadja locates the core of Jefferson’s position in a “theory of progress”  writing that 66
Jefferson and his compatriots thought nations developed in the same ways and so particular levels of 
progress could be predicted as requirements for representative government.  However, there are 67
strong contradictions in this position if we place Jefferson’s opinion on the ‘educational process’ 
together with his comments about Europe and the prospects for U.S. territorial expansion. Jefferson 
wrote that “I do not despair of Europe. The advance of mind which has taken place everywhere 
cannot retrograde”  before going on to describe the previously quoted ameliorative prospects of 68
representative government. The “mind” of Europe is advancing even though Europe appears, in his 
65Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 14 May 1817, letter printed in Paul Ford, ed. ​The 
Works of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol 12​ (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 64. 
66Zoltán Vadja, “Thomas Jefferson on the Character of an Unfree People: The Case of Spanish America,” ​American 
Nineteenth Century History 8​, no. 3 (2007): 276. 
67Ibid. 
68Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, 2 August 1823, letter printed in Paul Ford, ed. ​The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol 12​ (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​299-300.  
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time, still Catholic and still under the influence of kings, the two influences he notes as having the 
most harmful effects on the prospect of representative government in Latin America.  
The contradiction gets even stronger when the self-interest of the United States becomes 
involved. Vadja uses Louisiana as an example of a Catholic region whose incorporative process into 
the United States reveals the implementation structure of Jefferson’s theory of progress. Vajda walks 
through how Louisiana was structured as a territory in 1804, before being granted the power to elect 
federal representatives in 1805, and finally being given full statehood in 1812, although even then 
with limited autonomous control.  Outside of the retained restrictions, Louisiana effectively took 69
about eight years to become a state with an equal federal role to the others. However Jefferson, in 
his 1811 letter to Dupont de Nemours declared that in Latin America even “should their new rulers 
lay their shoulders to remove the great obstacles of ignorance, and press the remedies of education 
and information, they will still be in jeopardy until another generation comes into place, and what 
may happen in the interval cannot be predicted.”  Jefferson believes it will take at least a generation 70
to fully ingrain the practice of representative government into the Spanish territorial population even 
though he helps personally oversee the eight year process of Louisiana becoming a state with 
relatively equal rights to the rest. The clear differentiating factor here is that Louisiana was to 
become a part of the United States, directly adding its territory and resources to the U.S., while Latin 
America was not.  
This double-standard continues when Jefferson wrote about Florida and Cuba that “I have 
ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could be made to our system of States”
69Zoltán Vadja, “Thomas Jefferson on the Character of an Unfree People: The Case of Spanish America,” ​American 
Nineteenth Century History 8​, no. 3 (2007): 277. 
70Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Dupont De Nemours, 15 April 1811, letter printed in Paul Ford, ed. ​The Works 
of Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol 11 ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​196-204. 
 
 
25 
 and earlier that “we may as well receive the offers of the Floridas & Cuba, which probably be 71
made to us by their inhabitants.”  While Vajda notes reservations about Louisiana’s population, 72
these reservations are overcome quite quickly and when Jefferson writes about Florida and Cuba he 
includes no mention of the populations not being able to maintain the representative government 
structure that would be imposed on them by the United States. This is in contrast to his constantly 
vocalized reservations about this ability in the revolutionary Latin American context. Once again, 
with the possibility of territorial expansion Jefferson overlooks the limitations that would otherwise 
restrict his belief in the capacity for representative government.  
This rational is reinforced in his outline of the benefits of Cuban inclusion into the United 
States in which Jefferson stated that “the control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us 
over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose 
waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being.”  Here Jefferson focuses 73
solely on the benefit for the United States rather than on the problems with implementing 
representative government in these populations. Vadja’s “theory of progress” cannot, therefore, be 
applied to Jefferson in all instances. In cases where the United States stood to gain territory and its 
corresponding advantage, Jefferson was clearly willing to overlook the downsides of what in his view 
ought to be an ‘ignorant and bigoted’ population incapable of liberty “without intoxication.” This 
exception is best explained by the gravity of the benefit Cuba and Florida would bestow on the 
United States. Jefferson was willing to diagnose and condemn those far away Latin American 
71Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823​, ​letter printed in Merrill Peterson, ed. ​Thomas 
Jefferson: Writings ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1482. 
72Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, 25 May 1809, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved 
from the Library of Congress, accessed 2 November 2017, https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib019954/. 
73Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823, letter printed in Merrill Peterson, ed. ​Thomas 
Jefferson: Writings ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1484-1485. 
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revolutions but when the United States stood to territorially benefit, Jefferson’s reservations about a 
Catholic colonial population were easily overcome.  
There is, however, another explanation for this: slavery. Underneath all of Jefferson’s 
commentary on Latin American revolutions is a complete silence regarding slavery. Although 
Jefferson assuredly knew about the anti-slavery projects that were included in Latin American 
independence—Fitz’s outline of the American popular knowledge of this renders it nigh impossible 
that Jefferson could not know—he says absolutely nothing about it. Jefferson’s double standard with 
regard to Southern Latin America as opposed to Florida and Cuba takes on a new light when placed 
next to another letter to Monroe. In this he stated “to us the province of Techas [Texas] will be the 
richest State of our Union, without any exception. Its southern part will make more sugar than we 
can consume, and the Red river, on its north, is the most luxuriant on earth.”  What Louisiana, 74
Florida, Cuba, and Texas all had in common outside of their potential for U.S. expansion was that 
they were all viable slave states. The sugar plantations Jefferson envisions making Texas “the richest 
State of our Union,​ without any exception​” would clearly be created through a drastic expansion of 
slavery into the region. During this time all sugar plantations had and continued to run using slaves 
and neither Jefferson nor any politician referencing the wealth of sugar production in the region 
would have assumed otherwise. One extraordinarily crucial difference, then, between the colonial 
Catholic populations revolting farther south and those living farther north is that the former were 
engaged in a process of emancipation while the latter presented the opportunity for a radical 
expansion of both territory and the economic engine of slavery. Jefferson’s status as a slave owner 
himself only heightens slavery’s validity as an explanation for his double standard regarding Catholic 
74Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 14 May 1820, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​160-161. 
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colonial populations. Ignorance and bigotry, it seems, were created under Catholic Spanish colonial 
rule but could be forgiven by U.S. expansionism.   
Adding to this, Fitz’s book does a great deal of work to prove the impact slavery had on 
American perceptions of the Latin American revolutions. While her book highlights that up until 
around 1826 most public statements about these revolutions avoided critiquing the deconstruction 
of slavery in these contexts, the book also relates how after 1826 the opposition to John Quincy 
Adams’ delegation to the Panama Convention focused on slavery as a primary tactic of their 
opposition. Once Senator John Randolph and other politicians brought this issue to the forefront, it 
took hold in the American public and led to the questioning not only of support for the Panama 
Convention and the revolutions, but of the very principles of equality outlined in the Declaration of 
Independence.  Fitz tracks these changes using political speeches, newspapers, and Fourth of July 75
toasts and while these get at public discourse, they do not provide direct insight into the individual’s 
private thoughts. The rapidity of the shift from acceptance of emancipation as a tool of revolution 
to direct and extremely racialized critique can, however, serve as evidence for slavery’s importance in 
Jefferson’s perception of the revolutions. It was slave owners like Jefferson who, once this racialized 
pro-slavery rhetoric was begun, took to it with remarkable speed and what becomes clear from this 
speed was that slavery was always, in some fashion, a part of their private perceptions of Latin 
American revolutions. Fitz does not make this point and Jefferson died before the discourse-shift 
she outlines occurs, but given Jefferson’s position as a slave owner within the same Virginia 
plantation class, it is reasonable to extend this racialized view of the revolutions to Jefferson, at least 
in part. Although he presumably would have opposed Randolph’s attack on the principles he wrote 
75Caitlin Fitz, “An Imaginary Kindred,” in ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016): 
194-240. 
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into the Declaration, Jefferson’s near-salivation at the wealth of sugar-producing Texas as opposed 
to his extreme skepticism regarding the revolutions farther South, combined with his position in a 
society that quickly embraced racialized rhetoric once it was made publicly acceptable, render slavery 
an excellent explanation for his skepticism of representative governments in this region.  
Vadja’s “theory of progress” explanation must, therefore, be contextualized within 
Jefferson’s identity and the politics of slavery. Jefferson’s reservations were clearly mitigated by the 
prospects of territorial expansion, profit, and strategic gain on the part of the United States, 
especially on the part of the Southern half of the United States. Jefferson’s views were influenced by 
more than his Black Legend based biases and picture of the Latin American populace as 
undeveloped: they are deeply wrapped up with the experience of the French Revolution, the 
self-interest of the United States, and based around Jefferson’s racialized perspective. These factors 
are not directly noted in Jefferson’s writings but are present subtextually, in his allusions, choice of 
words, and unspoken realities. For Jefferson, the Latin American revolutions contained the potential 
for all of the things he fears most: the imposition of Catholicism, violent military despotism, and a 
violent end of slavery. They also, most crucially, had no potential for U.S. territorial expansion and, 
in fact, the formation of new states meant that the U.S. could not take over these territories after 
Spain ceded control. These were the imaginations that drove his perspective on the prospects for 
representative government in these new Latin American states.  
A Preferable Course of Events 
If slavery and territorial expansion drove Jefferson’s ideas about whether Latin America was 
capable of representative government, they also informed the course he hoped history would take. 
The plan Jefferson laid out contradicted his support of independence but clearly advanced the 
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interests of the United States. This provides further proof that undergirding Jefferson’s principles 
was a clear notion of this interest and its primacy. In order to discuss this plan in detail, this section 
will first extrapolate the factors motivating U.S. action as well as the potential benefits and 
downsides to such action. Jefferson’s ideal course of events will then be analyzed in light of these 
factors and the self-interested nature of the scheme, and the implications of this, will then be 
extrapolated.  
Jefferson was a participant in the U.S. act of revolution, calling for independence and 
engaging in the debates and political efforts surrounding its achievement. Therefore, his perspective 
extended beyond thoughts on representative government to the methods by which this government 
should be created. As was shown above, Jefferson thought that the people of Latin America were 
not ready for self-governance, however this belief did not prevent his support for their revolutions. 
In a letter to John Adams, Jefferson wrote that “it is our duty to wish them independence and 
self-government, because they wish it themselves, and they have the right, and we none, to chose for 
themselves and I wish, moreover, that our ideas may be erroneous, and theirs prove well founded.”  76
Jefferson notes his doubts in this letter, but puts them aside to assert that the revolutionaries have 
the right to engage in their efforts. This attitude continues into his letter to Antoine Destutt de Tracy 
in which he declares that “prepared however, or not, for self-government, if it is their will to make 
the trial, it is our duty and desire to wish it cordially success, and of ultimate success there can be no 
doubt, and that it will richly repay all intermediate sufferings.”  Jefferson goes farther in this letter, 77
arguing that the revolutions and attempts at self-governance will eventually succeed and pay off. 
76Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 17 May 1818, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​95-96. 
77Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to A.C.V.C. Destutt De Tracy, 26 December 1820, letter printed in ​The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 181-184. 
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However, he also notes his reservations about the preparations of the revolutionaries and these had 
a clear influence on the path Jefferson thinks the revolutions ought to take. 
While political, economic, and strategic reasons motivating support will be discussed, 
Jefferson also put forward a core reason for this support whose logic would resonate into the 
actions of his presidential successors. Writing to James Monroe in 1816, Jefferson said that the Latin 
American revolutions should be extended “every kindness….every friendly office and aid within the 
limits of the law of nations” because “this is but an assertion of our own independence.”  78
Jefferson’s support goes beyond just wishing these nations well; for him their independence is 
innately tied to that of the United States. Having just exited the War of 1812, arguably the second 
and definitive war for American independence, the United States still wielded relatively little 
influence and so these Latin American revolutions presented both an opportunity and a problem. 
Jefferson’s use of “our independence” reveals that he framed these revolutions not only as 
important in and of themselves, but important especially because of how they related to the United 
States. This adds to the analysis in previous sections which also make clear that the self-interest of 
the United States is the lens through which Jefferson views these events. It also foreshadows the 
Monroe Doctrine’s perspective that the situation in Latin America was inherently linked to the 
concerns of the United States.  
While the U.S. had reasons to support Latin American revolutions, it was also nudged into 
doing so by various factors. Firstly, the United States was put in the position of principally having to 
support these revolutions due to their similarity to its own. It would be hard for the United States to 
condemn revolutions based around the goals of independence from colonial control and 
78Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 4 February 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 514-518. 
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representative government because doing so would be condemn the principles upon which its own 
revolution was founded. In ​Our Sister Republics​, Fitz walks through how, by this time, a sense of these 
principles was already established in U.S. political culture.  This might have remained only a 79
problem in theory if not for the second dilemma which was the incredible amount of public support 
for these revolutions in the United States. Using Fourth of July toasts, town names, baby names, and 
other metrics Fitz displays how incredibly popular these revolutions became as word of them spread 
throughout the United States. Additionally, revolutionary agents arriving in America went to the 
newspapers to drum up support for their cause, frequently referencing the American revolution as 
the inspiration and model for the southern revolutions. While this was often an exaggeration based 
on their audience, it emphasized the principled reasons why the United States should support the 
revolutions to the national public, making the contradiction of refusing support much harder for 
politicians to defend or electorally endure.   80
Although support was motivated by the actions of these revolutionary agents and the will of 
the public, the U.S.  also had its own political and economic reasons for supporting the further 
independence of the American hemisphere. Trade with Latin America presented a clear opportunity 
for economic expansion. Independence would release the colonies from their obligation to trade 
only within Spain’s imperial network and, while the majority of U.S. southern trade was with Cuba, 
merchants sensed the potential profits to be reaped by the opening up of these additional regions to 
greater economic ties.  Especially if Cuba returned to its inter-imperial trading obligations, trade 81
with an independent South America and Mexico could help offset the deficit this would create.  
79Caitlin Fitz, “An Imaginary Kindred,” in ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016): 
194-240. 
80Caitlin Fitz, “Agents of Revolution,” in ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016): 
146-80. 
81Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016) 19-21, 167-169. 
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Additionally, an independent South and Central America presented a clearly advantageous 
geopolitical situation for the U.S. In his 1813 letter to Von Humboldt Jefferson wrote that: 
In whatever governments they end they will be ​American ​governments, no longer to be 
involved in the never-ceasing broils of Europe….America has a hemisphere to itself. It must 
have its separate system of interests, which must not be subordinated to those of Europe. 
The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail it 
that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the 
wide oceans which separate us from them.  82
 
With the independence of the Americas, Jefferson envisioned a future in which the metropole and 
colonial wars of Europe never disrupted the United States or the rest of the Americas. These new 
nations would be able to trade in peace, free from the threat of European embargo, leveraging of 
resources and men for war, and other disruptive activities. Furthermore, a continent free of 
European influence would relieve the United States of the possibility that actions around its own 
territory would draw it into war with a much stronger European state, a process that equally 
threatened to draw the United States into European alliance and all of the events Washington 
cautioned against in his farewell address.  This freedom of action would also allow for a smoother 83
U.S. expansion throughout the Western hemisphere. This goal and theme is found throughout 
Jefferson’s thought including in his 1823 letter to President Monroe which would be a part of the 
debate leading to the Monroe Doctrine.  84
Jefferson also saw independence as eventually leading to peace with Spain, writing to 
Monroe that “their separation from Spain seals our everlasting peace with her.”  He went on to 85
82 Thomas Jefferson, ​Thomas Jefferson to Alexander von Humboldt, December 6, 1813, ​Letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 
ed. Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1311-1312. 
83George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796, Written Speech, retrieved from the Yale Law School Lillian Goldman 
Law Library, accessed 4 December 2017, ​http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp​.  
84Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823​, ​letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ​ed. 
Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984), 1481-1482. 
85Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 4 February 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​515. 
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write that “so long as they are dependent, Spain from her jealousy, is our natural enemy and always 
in either open or secret hostility with us. These countries, too, in war, will be a powerful weight in 
her scale, and, in peace, totally shut to us.”  Jefferson thought the independence of Spain’s colonies 86
was required in order for the U.S. to keep peace with Spain, an issue naturally on his mind after the 
devastation of the war of 1812 which had a personal effect on Jefferson’s finances as well as the 
entire nation.  87
This goal of peace was also connected to the type of government Jefferson hoped these new 
states would enact. In 1822 Jefferson wrote that “it is lawful to wish to see no emperors nor king in 
our hemisphere, and that Brazil as well as Mexico will homologize with us.”  This theme continued 88
into the 1823 letter in which he wrote that “our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere 
that of freedom.”  While Jefferson was not a democratic peace theorist, he wrote about 89
representative government and a peaceful future in the same pen stroke and so, in his imagination, 
these two things were closely linked. Writing to Lafayette in 1813, after presenting the threat of the 
revolutions ending in military despotism Jefferson asserted that “among these there can be no 
confederacy. A republic of kings is impossible. But their future wars and quarrels among themselves 
will oblige them to bring the people into action.”  This letter demonstrates that when Jefferson 90
envisioned an independent Latin America, he thought that the only way it could be peaceful, and the 
86Ibid. 
87Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Leroy and Bayard, 7 April 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol 11, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​518. 
88Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 1 December 1822, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​273-274. 
89Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823​, ​letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ​ed. 
Merrill Peterson (New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1481-1482. 
90Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 30 November 1813, letter printed in ​The Works of 
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least disruptive to the U.S. was if it were to be self-governed.  This combination of principle, public 91
opinion, and economic and political incentives put the United States in a position where it had to 
support these revolutions in some way.  
There were also significant dangers to this support. The first of these were the pitfalls 
involved with the U.S. making an enemy of Spain and it was Jefferson’s firm opinion that the U.S. 
should avoid war. In his letter to Destutt de Tracy, Jefferson said that “we view Europe as covering 
at present a smothered fire, which may shortly burst forth and produce general conflagration. From 
this it is our duty to keep aloof.”  Jefferson believed that this war would “hurt us more than it 92
would help our brethren of the South” and that their generation had to pay its own war debts before 
more could be incurred which, he thought, would constitute “mortgaging posterity.”  Jefferson saw 93
the prospect of war with Spain as extraordinarily harmful to the United States, drawing it into a 
broader European conflict and creating a great deal of debt that would harm U.S. fiscal security into 
the future. Indeed, in an 1820 letter to Monroe Jefferson declared that “neither the state of our 
finances, the condition of our country, nor the public opinion, urges us to precipitation into war”  94
and voiced his support for the U.S. treaty with Spain. For Jefferson, then, all factors seemed bent 
against war. Having had three major wars-the Seven Years War, the War of U.S. Independence, and 
the War of 1812-occur within his own lifetime, part of Jefferson’s hesitation to strongly support the 
revolutions seems to stem from war weariness. The prospect of triggering conflict with Spain was, 
91While this might seem counter-intuitive given Jefferson’s doubts about Latin American self-governing capability, he 
thought that this could be developed over time thereby, in the long-term, leading to hemispheric peace. 
92Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to A.C.V.C. Destutt De Tracy, 26 December 1820, letter printed in ​The Works of 
Thomas Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​181-184. 
93Ibid. 
94Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 14 May 1820, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12​, ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​160-161. 
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therefore, a powerful reason against clear and strong U.S. support of the Latin American 
revolutions.  
With regards to Spain, other negative consequences were possible, either connected to the 
possibility of war or independent from it. During this period the United States was consistently 
engaged in negotiations with Spain over territory, namely the Floridas. Inciting Spanish anger would 
assuredly jeopardize those negotiations and the addition of future slave states to the U.S. There was 
also the matter of trade. The United States engaged in a great deal of trade with both Cuba and with 
the Iberian peninsula,  much more than with the rest of Spanish America and this trade could cease 95
in the event of a conflict with, or the displeasure of, the Spanish crown. Economically and 
territorially the U.S. had a lot to lose by supporting these new revolutions.  
These were largely the same concerns Jefferson faced when he made the decision not to aid 
Francisco de Miranda’s attempted revolution and to disown and prosecute all those involved in it. 
Jefferson had previously made the calculation that these potential losses were not worth the risk of 
supporting an independence effort in the South, but now that these independence efforts were 
happening and were succeeding the issue was forced upon the U.S. in a way it was not by the 
Miranda affair. Although the same concerns were present with Bolivar’s revolution if lessened by 
Napoleon’s Iberian invasion, the U.S. was unable to base its position around the total neutrality that 
Jefferson had previously found so advantageous.  
Because of the viability of these revolutions, a new set of threats emerged beyond just the 
Spanish reaction to U.S. support. When Jefferson looked at South and Central America, he saw an 
uncertain future and one whose structure was potentially hostile to U.S. interests. This potentially 
95Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016) 19-21, 167-169. 
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hostile structure had two main prongs, one economic and one political. Economically Jefferson saw 
the newly independent Latin American states as rivals. Writing to Monroe in 1816, Jefferson said 
that “when they are free, they will drive every article of our produce from every market, by 
underselling it, and change the condition of our existence, forcing us into other habits and pursuits. 
We shall, indeed, have in exchange some commerce with them, but in what I know not, for we shall 
have nothing to offer which they cannot raise cheaper.”  In Jefferson’s imagination of the future of 96
American commerce, South and Central American goods provide direct competition to the 
economic well being of the U.S. He did think there would be some advantage gained in terms of 
commerce, but there would be significant downsides that this would have to be weighed against.  
Additionally, and perhaps more worryingly, Jefferson was concerned with the potential 
political, and possibly military, rivalry of these Latin American nations still in the process of being 
created. Jefferson wrote that they will “perhaps have formed themselves into one or more 
confederacies; more than one I hope, as in single mass they would be a very formidable neighbor.”  97
In this passage Jefferson displays a clear anxiety about the possibility that his dream of hemispheric 
peace would be eradicated by a powerful polity to the South. This worry clearly emerged in part 
because he had watched the French Revolution lead to Napoleon’s conquest of Europe. This is 
backed up by all of the allusions to Napoleon highlighted earlier in this chapter and also by the 
realities of the situation. The U.S. did not benefit from the “bulwark”  of Britain nor the Atlantic 98
Ocean as barriers preventing the revolutionary violence in the South from gradually extending north 
to its shores. Indeed this extension must have felt entirely possible given the proximity of Mexico. 
96Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 4 February 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11​, ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​515. 
97Ibid, 516. 
98Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Sir John Sinclair, 30 June 1803​, ​letter printed in ​The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 
Vol. 40, ​ed. Barbara Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 637-638. 
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The link to Napoleon is apt for another reason: Simon Bolivar. Bolivar conquered more territory 
than Napoleon  and oftentimes in harsher conditions. He was the hero of many U.S. songs,  but 99 100
Jefferson’s Napoleonic anxiety would presumably only be exponentially increased by Bolivar’s 
success. While, in an 1823 letter to Monroe Jefferson declared that “of the brethren of our own 
hemisphere, none are yet, nor for an age to come will be, in a shape, condition, or disposition to war 
against us”  this letter comes after the concerns already outlined in this chapter and after the 1816 101
solution these concerns resulted in, which will be analyzed shortly. Jefferson, therefore, was worried 
about a strong South or Central American state which could at the very least exert an influence to 
challenge that of the U.S., and at the worst engage in Napoleonic, or perhaps better termed, 
Bolivarian actions aimed Northward. This fear was heightened by the possibility that such actions 
might violently destabilize the southern slave economy.  Additionally, even if unable to impact the 102
U.S. itself, strong Latin American states would provide effective resistance to U.S. plans for 
territorial expansion.  
These, then, were Jefferson’s concerns about the situation. Jefferson noted that “on the 
question of our interest in their independence, were that alone a sufficient motive of action, much 
may be said on both sides.”  As has been outlined in this section and as Jefferson’s words 103
themselves support, the question of U.S. interest was a mixed one. However, later on in that very 
same letter Jefferson goes on to write that “interest, then, on the whole, would wish their 
99Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 197. 
100Ibid, 116-118. 
101Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823, letter printed in ​Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ​ed. 
Merrill Peterson​ ​(New York: The Library of America, 1984) 1481-1485. 
102Donald Hickey, “America’s Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806,” ​Journal of the Early Republic 2, ​no. 4 
(1982): 368.  
103Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 4 February 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
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independence, and justice makes the wish a duty.”  The overall interest of the U.S., justice, and the 104
other reasons outlined above all motivate the U.S. to wish for Latin American success. In this case 
the question then becomes how representative government structures might most peacefully and 
effectively be instituted in Latin America. This question is closely connected to Jefferson’s doubts 
about the viability of this. In relation to these doubts, Jefferson says that while he might wish them 
to successfully implement self-government “the question is not what we wish, but what is 
practicable?”  105
Jefferson had a very clear answer to what he thought was “practicable” which he 
communicated to Lafayette in the same 1817 letter. In this Jefferson declared that:  
The best thing for them, would be for themselves to come to an accord with Spain, under 
the guarantee of France, Russia, Holland, and the United States, allowing to Spain a nominal 
supremacy, with authority only to keep the peace among them, leaving to them otherwise all 
the powers of self-government, until their experience in them, their emancipation from their 
priests, and advancement in information, shall prepare them for complete independence.   106
 
Jefferson outlines a kind of multilateral state building and peacekeeping scheme that is unusual and 
the tenants of which must be parsed to reveal exactly why he thinks this would be the best way for 
independence and the creation of representative government to be structured. First of all, this was in 
no way “practicable” because Catholic Spain would never agree to a plan that hinged partially on the 
goal of ‘emancipating’ the Latin American populace from the influence of the Catholic Church. 
Secondly, no revolutionary leader knowing they were on the verge of victory would ever agree to live 
under the “nominal supremacy” of Spain even if it was with the goal of keeping the peace, largely 
because they would have no reason to trust Spain or the other nations’ willingness to go to war with 
104Ibid, 516. 
105Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis De Lafayette, 14 May 1817, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 12, ​ed. Paul Ford (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905),​ ​62. 
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Spain to keep it in check. This plan, then, makes no practical sense but it has one crucial, basic 
effect: it gives the U.S. more leverage and control over the future of its hemispheric neighbors than 
it otherwise would have.  
Analyzed through this lens, Jefferson’s scheme seems to solve all of the potential downsides 
to Latin American independence while retaining the benefits. By including Spain in its structure, this 
plan would allow the U.S. to fully support the spread of representative government into the rest of 
the Americas without the risk of angering Spain and triggering negative responses in the spheres of 
trade or war. Furthermore, it would assure peace is maintained in the region. These new states would 
not have to support Spain in the event of a conflict with the U.S. and Spain would act as a check on 
any violence they might seek to impose on each other or on the U.S. In creating this structure, the 
U.S. might have a voice as to whether Latin America would be divided, as Jefferson thought it ought 
to be in order to prevent the formation of an effective rival to the U.S. Helping to broker a deal, the 
United States would be at the negotiating table and could attach provisions to the arrangement to 
mitigate the potential political and military harms these new states might create for the United States. 
Negotiating this arrangement might allow the U.S. to try and structure trade in such a way as to 
guard against the harmful flow of Latin American goods into the market. Finally, the creation of 
such a structure might give the U.S. the opportunity, as was common in such conferences, to 
arrange for a transfer of some Spanish territory into U.S. control. Regardless of whether these things 
would happen, the U.S. would be able to play a greater role in designing the future were it part of 
such an structure.   
This plan might also protect American slavery because Spain’s profits from slavery and the 
slave trade, especially through its sugar plantations in Cuba, meant Spain had a great deal of 
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incentive to ensure that further emancipation was halted. Giving Spain “nominal supremacy” and 
the ability to “keep the peace” would allow these incentives to be harnessed towards the guarantee 
of slavery’s continuation in the United States and the Caribbean, including Cuba which was greatly 
coveted by the U.S. Additionally, the exclusion of Britain, perhaps the most important state at the 
time, from this scheme is noteworthy and could be explained by the previous history of conflict but 
the more likely explanation concerns the slave trade. Excluding Britain from the hemisphere meant 
excluding its campaign against the slave trade and protecting deeply entrenched U.S. interests in the 
illegal slave trade. This connection will be expanded upon in chapter three but is worth noting here. 
Analyzed in light of what the U.S. stood to gain and lose from supporting these revolutions, or 
simply from their existence, it is clear that Jefferson’s scheme reduced all of the downsides and 
dilemmas the United States faced while allowing for the full leveraging of the opportunity these 
revolutions presented for furthering U.S. interests.  
This was not implemented, but the basic idea that the U.S. ought to have a role in 
determining the future of the American hemisphere was clearly present in the arguments in favor of 
the U.S. attending the 1826 Congress of Panama organized by Simon Bolivar. Henry Clay argued 
that the United States should attend because it would allow the U.S. to try to prevent any further 
emancipatory efforts on the part of Latin American revolutionaries, namely the invasion and freeing 
of Cuba.  U.S. politics around these meetings largely revolved around questions of how to 107
moderate these anti-slavery impulses and we can see the same outcome is achievable in Jefferson’s 
plan. Jefferson was mirroring the ‘moderating force’ reasoning driving the U.S. mission to Panama.   
107Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics​ (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 214.  
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That this was Jefferson’s prefered course of events and that it directly lined up with the U.S. 
interest is important for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the plan he outlined directly contradicts his 
principled stance on independence. Jefferson stated that “they have a right to be free” and that 
“justice”  is behind the duty of the U.S. to wish these states success, but then advocated for a 108
system in which he gave Spain “nominal supremacy” over these states. His contradiction of the 
principle is explained largely by this principle being conditional on the favorability of its outcome to 
the United States, especially its ambitions for territorial expansion and the slave economy. This 
spilled over into how he evaluated the prospects for representative government itself. Jefferson’s 
plan for gradual independence comes right after his questioning of the ability of the South and 
Central American populace to govern itself. This questioning, then, is closely linked to his U.S. 
advantageous solution. By doubting their ability, Jefferson creates a convenient rationale for devising 
a system to give the U.S. greater control over the future of its neighbors. Whether a people is 
capable of governing themselves and the methods through which they should go about doing it 
were, in Jefferson’s thoughts, dependent on the interests of the United States. Although he did not 
directly say this, the contradictions and patterns in his thought reveal that although he held up the 
principle of freedom, he did so when it was convenient and called its viability into question 
whenever it was not.  
Conclusion 
Both Jefferson’s views on the possibility for the success of republicanism in Latin America 
and his thoughts on how this would best be created were subservient to the interests of the United 
States. Freedom, self-governance, and independence were, even in the mind of one of their most 
108Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 4 February 1816, letter printed in ​The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 11, ​ed. Paul Ford​ ​(New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1905), 516. 
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famous authors, principles that were to be adhered to only if it was advantageous to do so. 
Jefferson’s position as the creator of the broader American ideology makes this subservience even 
more striking. He was a unique actor whose perspective on this moment manifested in two areas: his 
vision for territorial expansion and his position as a slaveholder. This is important because these 
lenses inform his vision for what Latin American independence ought to look like. Fitz’ ​Our Sister 
Republics ​highlights an explosion in slave owner concern about Latin American emancipation efforts 
that could not have emerged out of a void. More probable is that these concerns were latent, 
removed from the public sphere and Jefferson, as a slave owner, was party to these very concerns. 
Furthermore, only a few years after these letters were written the U.S. became preoccupied with 
halting the spread of Latin American emancipation into Cuba and given that Jefferson was writing 
and conversing with the same political class that would debate this, it is unlikely he was not privy to 
these same concerns and that he did not share them. Jefferson looked toward both Cuba and Texas 
as territories whose inclusion into the U.S. would yield slave-based economies of immense value, 
and he owned slaves himself. Jefferson’s perspective was inherently wrapped up in slavery.  
When he wrote about the possibility of military despotisms, alluded to the fear of 
Napoleonic leaders, and devised plans in which the slave-based Spanish Empire would keep the 
newly independent nations in check, it was from this perspective. In this moment Jefferson was an 
actor uncertain about what the future of his hemisphere would be. So when Jefferson looked south, 
he imagined what for him was the worst: seeing the possibility for military despotism, Latin 
American unity, and the rise of a military leader whose further conquests could bring emancipation 
to the United States’ very doorstep or, at the very least, halt U.S. plans for territorial expansion. 
Indeed, Bolivar conquered more territory than Napoleon based partly on the strategy of 
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emancipation and Toussaint L’Ouverture was one of the few leaders successful in standing up to 
Napoleon. Jefferson imagined a Latin America based on emancipation with the resources to enact 
this ideology of freedom throughout the hemisphere if not kept on the Spanish leash. This fear fits 
within Jefferson’s general psychological perspective. Slave owners were constantly terrified of slave 
rebellions and poisoning, and this was so deeply a part of their perspective that they might have 
worried about publishing information about Latin American emancipation for fear that the example 
would motivate U.S. slaves to their own rebellion.  Additionally, Britain’s previous use of the 109
promise of emancipation to leverage U.S. slaves against their masters, and the presence of black 
military leaders throughout the wars in Latin America, assuredly only heightened this concern. 
Jefferson’s, then, was a perspective defined by a much larger version of slave rebellion phobia: the 
fear of intra-hemispheric emancipatory conquest. While at times he might have doubted the ability 
of these new states to wage war against the U.S., the possibility stemming from Bolivar’s unlikely 
success and future likelihood of this ability meant that this was still a very reasonable concern. Even 
if it was not reasonable, Jefferson’s perspective being so deeply rooted in slave owner fears made 
even improbable possibilities seem terrifying and Jefferson’s prefered vision of Latin American 
government was informed by this fear.  
Outside of this fear, Jefferson’s differentiation between Mexico and Cuba, Florida and 
Venezuela, Louisiana and La Plata demonstrates that, for him, U.S. expansion was a key concern. 
Latin America was a possible venue for this expansion, but it could also be a hindrance. Looking to 
the future, Jefferson prefered a world where Latin America could be reigned in by the U.S. so that 
his vision of territorial growth, including a radical expansion of slave-based agriculture, could be 
109Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics​ (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 88.   
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realized. Not only was his vision of when representative government was viable driven by this goal, 
but so was his plan to implement this government in the long-term. Jefferson prefered Spain keep a 
monarchical hold on an increasingly republican Latin America because otherwise the U.S. might lose 
its status as the increasingly dominant power in the hemisphere, and all the potential for expansion 
that went along with it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
Chapter II-Madison 
James Madison, a primary designer of the U.S. constitution, is a figure one would expect to 
have much to say about representative government in Latin America. However, Madison actually 
had little to say on the topic. Compared to his reaction to the French revolution, Madison’s 
approach to Latin American revolutions was more strategic than principled, focused around the 
geopolitical interests of the United States. This strategic focus was rooted in Madison’s identity as a 
slave owner, a perspective through which he viewed the southern revolutions that were undertaken, 
in large part, by persons of color.  
* * * 
Madison’s Perspective 
Born in Orange County Virginia not far from Monticello, James Madison came from the 
same Virginia planter class as Jefferson. His father, James Madison Sr., owned about five-thousand 
acres of land that were cultivated by a large population of slaves.  Madison grew up in this 110
environment, eventually leaving to attend what would later be called Princeton and enter into a 
prominent place in Virginia’s politics. From this position he would become embroiled in the U.S. 
war of independence and the creation of the United States constitution, eventually grappling with 
the implications of Latin American independence both as President of the United States and as a 
confidant of James Monroe.  
Madison’s thoughts on representative government were focused around his mistrust of ‘the 
people’s’ ability to govern themselves. Entering the constitutional convention in 1787, Madison 
brought this mistrust into his roles as an important thinker behind the United States Constitution 
110Paris Spies-Gans, “James Madison,” Princeton and Slavery, accessed 19 April 2018, 
https://slavery.princeton.edu/stories/james-madison#ref-12. 
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and as a federalist defender of the resulting document. In Federalist 10, Madison stated that “i​t may 
well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more 
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the 
purpose.”  ​Even in the United States, Madison believed that groups of people should not be relied 111
upon to act responsibly and that government should be structured to mitigate the harm these groups 
might cause. There is no reason to believe this same concern would not be a factor in how Madison 
thought about representative government in Latin America.  
Indeed, writing about the Spanish and Portuguese populations on the other side of the 
Atlantic, Madison declared they “need still further light & heat too from the American example 
before they will be a Match for the armies, the intrigues & the bribes of their Enemies, the treachery 
of their leaders, and what is most of all to be dreaded, their Priests & their Prejudices.”  While this 112
statement focuses on the Iberian population, it mirrors the Black Legend to which Jefferson also 
subscribed and, therefore, Madison’s doubts about the “Priests” and “Prejudices” of the Iberian 
Catholic population assuredly transferred to the Latin American colonial populace. In a separate 
letter Madison declared that “in the Papal System, Government and Religion are in a manner 
consolidated, & that is found to be the worst of Govts.”  The new South American states, 113
maintaining the Catholic faith they were colonized under, would fall within this categorization. 
Therefore as Madison confronted South American independence, he did so not only doubting the 
self-governing ability of all groups, but especially doubting the ability of Catholic populations.  
111James Madison, Federalist Paper: No. 10, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, accessed 19 April 2018, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp​.  
112James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 6 September 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from 
the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019251/. 
113James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Rev. Adams, 1832, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library of 
Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm021170/. 
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This confrontation began with his role as Secretary of State for then President Jefferson, but 
continued through his own presidency. Writing just over a month after his inauguration, Madison 
told Jefferson that France “must be equally aware of the importance of our relations to Spanish 
America” and that “the most probable source of conflict will be in his [Napoleon’s] extending the 
principle on which he required a ​prohibition ​of the Trade with St. Domingo to the case of the Spanish 
Colonies.”  Madison, therefore, entered the presidency with a clear sense of the value of Spanish 114
America to the United States, especially with regard to trade between the two regions. Two and a 
half years later, in 1811 Madison wrote to Joel Barlow that “Venezuala however has thrown off this 
mask, [of “nominal adherence to Ferdinand”] has communicated to us its declaration of 
Independence, and solicits our acknowledging it by receiving a Pub. Minister &c.”  This was one of 115
Madison’s first statements about South American independence and, while it would be a part of the 
politics Madison dealt with as President, with the start of the War of 1812 the issue of South 
American independence declined in relative importance. Additionally, due to continuous efforts to 
acquire the East Florida peninsula and other complicating factors, U.S. support of South America 
was delayed until 1822. For these reasons much of what Madison says about independence is located 
in the correspondence after his presidency.   116
In his retirement Madison returned to his plantation at Montpellier where he continued to 
oversee its operations and correspond with his various political connections, including Thomas 
Jefferson and James Monroe. Similar to Jefferson, Madison’s information about the situation in 
South America would have come from these letters and the newspapers passing information from 
114James Madison, James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 April 1809, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm015439/. 
115James Madison, James Madison to Joel Barlow, 17 November 1811, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm015875/. 
116This correspondence was, however, also highly edited by Madison in the years before his death.  
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the coast through to the interior. Indeed, in a letter to Jefferson, Madison notes his intention to pass 
on some of Alexander von Humboldt’s “draughts, or other maps”  that were sent to Washington 117
but were bound for Monticello. Madison was cued into the same networks of information as 
Jefferson, participated in the same revolutionary moment, and, like Jefferson, was Secretary of State 
before becoming President. However his reaction to Latin American independence, while similar to 
Jefferson’s in certain respects, is also characterized by distinct differences. It is this unique reaction, 
and its comparative counterparts, that the remainder of this chapter will focus on.  
Madison’s Thoughts 
As has been noted, in 1811 Madison wrote to Joel Barlow in response to the Venezuelan 
declaration of independence and the structure of this letter highlights a strategic approach that 
consistently guides Madison’s perspective on Latin American revolutions. After noting that 
Venezuela sent a public minister to the United States to solicit recognition and that the revolution in 
Mexico was ongoing, Madison shifts to a strategic analysis noting that “in what manner G.B. [Great 
Britain] will proceed in the case of Venezuela, & other districts following its example does not yet 
appear.”  He goes on to outline the possible reactions that Spain will have to these events before 118
shifting to the question of “E. Florida” and “the game she will play with Cuba.”  Upon first 119
hearing of Venezuela’s revolution, a revolution for independence similar to that of the United States, 
Madison’s initial reaction was to ponder the strategic effects of this revolution rather than its 
connection to the principles upon which Madison’s constitution and country were based. This focus 
117James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Thomas Jefferson​,​ 3 April 1812, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm016614/. 
118James Madison, James Madison to Joel Barlow, 17 November 1811, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm015875/. 
119Ibid. 
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on strategy, as will be shown in this and the ensuing sections, defines Madison’s perspective on Latin 
American revolutions.  
Madison’s strategic focus did not mean that principled rhetoric was wholly absent from his 
writings. In 1822 he wrote to Monroe defending his principled position after Joaquin de Anduaga, 
then Spanish Minister to the United States,  accused the U.S. of waiting to diplomatically recognize 120
an independent Spanish America until after the “cessation of Florida was secured.”  In this letter 121
Madison declared that: 
An historical view of the early sentiments expressed here in favor of our neighbors, the 
successive steps openly taken, manifesting our sympathy with their cause, & our anticipation 
of its success, more especially our declarations of neutrality towards the contending parties 
as engaged in a civil, not an insurrectionary, war, would shew the world that we never 
concealed the principles that governed us.   122
 
Here Madison clearly believes that the United States’ position throughout the revolutionary period 
in Latin America was visibly guided by principles, principles which, in his own words, were “in favor 
of our neighbors,” the newly independent Latin American states. This principled language continues 
into several other letters he wrote around this time. Writing to Monroe a year later about Canning’s 
proposal, Madison referenced the “great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism” and 
the United States’ “sympathies with their [the “Revolutionized Colonies”] liberties & independence.”
 In a later letter to Richard Rush, Monroe declared the Spanish American cause to be “righteous & 123
glorious”  while about a week later he told William Taylor that the governments preparing to act 124
120James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe,​ ​6 May 1822, Manuscript/Mixed Material, accessed 19 April 2018, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0441. 
121James Madison,​ ​James Madison to James Monroe, 6 May 1822, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library 
of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018329/. 
122Ibid. (My emphasis) 
123James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe​, ​30 October 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019279/. 
124James Madison, James Madison to Richard Rush​,​ 13 November 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019288/. 
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against Mexican independence were “confederated agst. the rights of man and the reforms of 
nations.”  It would seem, then, that principles consistently run through Madison’s thinking about 125
Latin American revolutions.  
However, when read in their entirety these letters show that principles are given relatively 
little weight in comparison to Madison’s strategic analysis and that they are oftentimes focused 
around the United States rather than on the prospects of a representatively governed Latin America.  
Writing to Jefferson in 1809, Madison declared that “the difficulty most likely to threaten 
our relations with France lies in the effort she may make to render us in some way subservient to the 
reduction of Spanish America; particularly by withholding our commerce.”  In a letter to William 126
Pinkney, Madison said that “the position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the 
destiny, even, of that Island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied 
spectator of its falling under any European Government, which might make a fulcrum of that 
position against the commerce and security of the United States.”  These letters demonstrate 127
Madison’s appraisal of the importance the Latin American region played in the United States’ 
commercial and security interests. While Cuba was not a space of revolution, with the Napoleonic 
invasion of Iberia the United States experienced a commercial windfall from the general opening of 
the Latin American region to non-imperial trade. In addition to shipping vast quantities of 
foodstuffs and other goods to Latin America, the U.S. had an interest in expanding its military 
125James Madison,​ ​James Madison to William Taylor​,​ 22 November 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from 
the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019293/. 
126James Madison, James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 1 May 1809, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm015380/. 
127James Madison,​ ​James Madison to William Pinkney, 30 October 1810, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm022951/. 
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presence in strategically important locales.  Madison was keenly aware of the commercial and 128
military expansion Latin American independence enabled and this is what he referred to when he 
highlighted the United States’ “deep interest” in a good relationship with Latin America. In fact, the 
very word “interest” had a specific connotation central to Madison’s political philosophy. Historian 
Gordon Wood notes in his essay “Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the 
Constitution” that the founders “​knew too well about ‘interest,’ which Madison defined ‘in the 
popular sense’ as the ‘immediate augmentation of property and wealth.’”  When Madison declared 129
that the United States had a “deep interest” in relations with Latin America, it was an interest that he 
himself defined as centered around material gain. 
After this commercially centered phrase, in this same letter to Monroe Madison ended his 
justification of U.S. action by outlining the increased threat the “Great Powers” would pose if they 
controlled the resources of Latin America. Here, we see Madison's initial appeal to principles morph 
into a strategic focus which continues throughout the rest of the letter. Latin America is introduced 
as a cause of liberty and independence, but quickly becomes an area of profit whose defeat would 
result in a grave threat to the United States. The ensuing page of strategic analysis about the various 
positions of Great Britain and Spain serves to highlight the relative lack of importance a free Spanish 
America had for Madison in comparison to the strategic intricacies of the situation and the possible 
benefits the United States could accrue. ​This compositional trend, of opening with a small measure 
128This analysis is derived from Arthur Whitaker, ​The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), 298-299. Although these pages describe the formation of U.S. naval 
stations in Latin America during the 1820s, Madison’s earlier knowledge of the strategic benefits of Latin American naval 
deployment may be reasonably extrapolated backward from this later policy, especially given its relative status as 
common policy knowledge.  
129Gordon Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness,” in ​Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National 
Identity, ​ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1987), 81. 
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of principled support for Latin America before focusing on the United States and moving to a more 
strategic focus, is a trend that continues into the next decade of Madison’s letters.  
For example, in the midst of the 1822 debate surrounding whether the U.S. should 
diplomatically recognize the Latin American states, Madison wrote to Monroe and defended the role 
principles played in U.S. action toward Latin America, before shifting his focus to the U.S. stating 
that “altho’ there may be no danger of hostile consequences from the Recognising act, it is desirable 
that our Republic should stand fair in the eyes of the world, not only for its own sake, but for that of 
Republicanism itself.”  Here Madison’s previously stated principled commitment to the Latin 130
American states contrastes with his reality, in which the reputation of the United States is declared to 
be central to the wellbeing of “Republicanism itself.” It was the United States, rather than the 
prospects for the creation of new republics in Latin America, that was the primary focus of 
Madison’s assessment of what is best for “republicanism” as a principle. Madison then begins to 
look at the situation strategically, analysing the “possible collisions with Spain on the Ocean, & the 
backing she may receive from some of the great powers friendly or unfriendly to us.”  131
Immediately after defending the United States’ principled commitment to Latin American 
independence, Madison positions the United States at the crux of the entire category of 
republicanism and goes on to analyze how the situation resulting from recognition could affect the 
wellbeing of the United States and its relations to other nations.  
In his October letter to Monroe which would contribute to the formation of the Monroe 
Doctrine, Madison declared that “in the great struggle of the Epoch between liberty and despotism, 
130James Madison,​ ​James Madison to James Monroe, 6 May 1822, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library 
of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018329/. 
131Ibid.  
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we owe it ​to ourselves ​to sustain the former in this hemisphere at least.”  The ‘struggle of principles’ 132
is, in actuality, a conflict Madison views through the lens of what the United States owes ‘to 
themselves,’ rather than what it might owe the Latin American revolutionizing colonies as a fellow 
former colony and proponent of representative government. Later on in this letter, Madison said 
that: 
The professions we have made to these neighbors, our sympathies with their liberties & 
independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the 
consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great Powers 
confederated agst. the rights & reforms, of which we have given so conspicuous & pervasive 
an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.  133
 
This passage is important because in it Madison outlines the reasons that the United States should 
take action to defeat the “mediated crusade.” While he does attribute some influence to the ideas of 
liberty and independence, this is immediately followed by the “interest” the United States has in 
relating to these neighbors and the danger of the “Great Powers” gaining access to the resources of 
Latin America. Behind Madison’s language of the “deep interest” is the reality of what this meant, 
namely commercial and political benefits.  
This same approach characterizes Madison’s 1823 letter to Richard Rush in which he wrote 
“our principles & our sympathies, the stand we have taken in their behalf, the deep interest we have 
in friendly relations with them, and even our security agst. the Great Powers”  motivate accepting 134
the Canning’s proposal. Here again “interest” appears as a crucial reason for U.S. action as does the 
“security” of the United States against the threat from the Great Powers. What is striking about this 
132James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe​, ​30 October 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019279/. 
133Ibid.  
134James Madison, James Madison to Richard Rush, 13 November 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019288/. 
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letter, however, is the clear process of strategic calculation that immediately follows this statement. 
Madison proclaimed that:  
The good that wd. result to the World from such an invitation [Canning’s invitation] if 
accepted, and the honor to our Country even if declined, outweigh the sacrifices that would 
be required, or the risks that wd. be incurred. With the British fleets & fiscal resources 
associated with our own we should be safe agst. the rest of the World, and at liberty to 
pursue whatever course might be prescribed by a just estimate of our moral & political 
obligations.  135
 
Madison’s use of “outweigh” is noteworthy because it emphasizes the strategic calculation central to 
his approach. While he might support Latin American independence in principle, that support is 
subservient to strategic calculation and it is the freedom of action this proposal would give the 
United States, rather than the freedom it would bring to Latin America, which is the focus of the 
latter half of this passage. Similar to Jefferson, this freedom of action can be connected to the 
possibility for territorial expansion and the third chapter will extrapolate on this connection.  
Furthermore, this passage highlights that in Madison’s mind U.S. action should be 
conditional on a low cost. In an earlier letter to Monroe, Madison stated his belief that if the United 
States could get France and Russia to support Spanish American independence, the “great work of 
its emancipation would then be compleated per saltum;  for Great Britain could not hold back if so 136
disposed, and Spain would have no choice but acquiescence.”  This statement is followed by more 137
strategic analysis about Britain centered around impressment and Canada. The structure here is 
striking because, after outlining a path for the guaranteed independence of Spanish America, 
Madison does not acknowledge the principled implications of this, but immediately moves on to the 
broader strategic landscape in which this prospect exists. In combination with his 1823 statement 
135Ibid.  
136“Per Saltum” meaning skipping steps, hopping.  
137James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe, 28 November 1818, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018575/. 
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about the benefits of “British fleets & fiscal resources,” this passage demonstrates Madison’s distinct 
preference for action when it incurs little to no cost on the United States.  
Madison’s approach to Latin American revolution was characterized by a preferencing of the 
strategic concerns of the United States over the principled issues involved in these revolutions. The 
principles Madison cited were often then related not to the revolutionizing Spanish colonies, but to 
the wellbeing of the United States. For Madison, principles were either subservient to strategic 
concerns or replaced with them. Madison’s writings on the situation in Latin America are 
proportionally dominated by strategic concerns, with principled issues being rare and oftentimes 
related to the United States rather than its neighbors. However there is one final peculiarity to 
Madison’s viewpoint: his focus on independence rather than representative government.  
As a designer of the U.S. constitution, one would expect Madison to have a great deal to say 
about the prospects for, and progress toward, representative government in Latin America. This is 
not the case. Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette in 1826, Madison stated his opinion that “Bolivar 
appears to have given a Constitution to the new State in Peru, of a countenance not altogether 
belonging to the American family. I have not yet seen its details; whether it shews him an apostate, 
or the people there, in his view, too benighted as yet for self-government, may possibly be a 
question.”  Here Madison says that Peru’s constitution is not in accordance with the “American 138
family,” but this statement is notable because Madison says little else about what would constitute an 
“American” governmental design. This is seemingly the only direct reference made in his 
correspondence to the issue of whether the governments in Latin America would be representative 
and, if so, what specific design that representative government would take and if it would be viable. 
138James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, November 
1826, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019857/. 
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This absence is striking and becomes more pronounced when it is connected to a letter Madison 
wrote to the Marquis six years earlier.  
In this earlier letter, Madison said that “free states seem indeed to be propagated in Europe, 
as rapidly as new States are on this side of the Atlantic.”  Madison’s language crafts a distinction 139
between the “free” states in Europe  and “new” states in Latin America, new but seemingly not free. 
If this is the case, why would Madison not have more to say about the ‘un-freedom’ of the new 
American states? The answer arrives in the language he uses in his other letters. In his 1823 letter to 
Rush, Madison declared his support for “defeating the efforts of the Holy Alliance to restore our 
Independent ​neighbors to the condition of Spanish Provinces.”  Then in his 1823 letter to Monroe, 140
he outlined the “sympathies with their liberties & independence”  while never specifying the cause 141
of representative government. In fact, in his 1822 letter to Monroe, Madison explicitly mentioned 
“republicanism”  only in the context of the United States, even though immediately beforehand he 142
was discussing the Mexican revolution and the South American revolutions more broadly. Madison’s 
omission cannot be boiled down to ignorance. Jefferson himself wrote about the prospect of 
representative government in Latin America, and Madison, as a designer of the constitution, ought 
to have even more to say on the prospect of his representative model being applied to other newly 
independent regions. The explanation, then, must be that whether or not Latin America was 
representatively governed did not concern Madison so long as it was independent.  
139James Madison, James Madison to Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, 25 
November 1820, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018788/. 
140James Madison, James Madison to Richard Rush​,​ 13 November 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  ​https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019288/​. (My emphasis) 
141James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe​, ​30 October 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed April 19, 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019279/. 
142James Madison,​ ​James Madison to James Monroe, 6 May 1822, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library 
of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018329/. 
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This reasoning is evidenced by how Madison talks about the 1817 revolution in 
Pernambuco, Brazil. In 1817 the state of Pernambuco, then controlled by the Portuguese monarch, 
revolted, declared its independence, and proclaimed itself a republic. Writing about this event, 
Madison worried about the reaction of European leaders to the revolt: 
The struggle of the Spanish part of it having the appearance of shaking off a ​foreign yolk, 
appeals merely to the interest & sympathy of those Sovereigns. That in the Brazils, may be 
viewed by them as an attack on a ​domestic​ throne.  143
 
Here Madison distinguishes between revolutions of independence and those which are more 
focused on a domestic separation which, in the case of Pernambuco, was partly with the goal of 
establishing a republic. Furthermore, in the same letter Madison issues his regrets “that any 
difficulties should have arisen with Portugal, the only recognized nation, beside ourselves, on this 
Hemisphere.”  Rather than the revolution in Pernambuco being a reason for celebrating the 144
expansion of republicanism in the Western Hemisphere, it had the opposite effect: causing Madison 
strategic concern as to the European reaction and regret that it had put a strain on the United States’ 
relationship with Portugal. Madison assuredly knew about the republican rhetoric surrounding 
Pernambuco, its prevalence in the newspapers and popular discourse would have made his 
ignorance of this quite unlikely.  In spite of this, Madison drew a distinction between the Spanish 145
revolutions, which were focused around the question of independence, and the Pernambuco 
revolution which, while “​domestic,​” was centered largely on the question of representative 
government. Here Madison was analyzing the possible reactions of European monarchs, but this 
analysis precisely proves his indifference to representative government in Latin America. Madison 
143James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Richard Rush, 27 June 1817, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, ​https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018453/​. (My emphasis) 
144Ibid. 
145Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 54-79. 
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not only views this republican revolution through a distinctly strategic lens, but worries that it will 
have a negative effect on the Spanish revolutions of independence. In essence, the republican revolt 
in Pernambuco is a worrying occurrence because it threatens the ​independence​ of the Spanish colonies 
elsewhere in the hemisphere.  
The French Revolution and the Question of Race 
Madison’s perspective on Latin American revolutions was characterized by a mixture of 
principles and strategy focused around U.S. political and commercial interests. The previous section 
sought to emphasize the prevalence of strategy over principles, but this prevalence becomes notable 
only when this perspective on Latin American revolutions is positioned against Madison’s reaction 
to the French revolution.  This comparison to the French Revolution reveals not only the degree to 
which strategy dominated Madison’ perspective on Latin American revolutions, but also the reason 
behind this domination. This section will first focus on the comparative prevalence of strategy in the 
Latin American case before moving on to the racial lens motivating this strategic approach. 
Writing to Jean Marie Roland in April 1793, Madison’s reaction to the French revolution was 
comparatively enthusiastic. Madison proclaimed that “in the catalogue of sublime truths and 
precious sentiments recorded in the revolution of France, none is more to be admired than the 
renunciation of those prejudices which have perverted the artificial boundaries of nations into 
exclusions of the philanthropy which ought to cement the whole into one great family”  Here 146
Madison engages with the principles characterizing the French revolution in a way he never did for 
Latin American revolutions. Moreover, Madison is not only supportive, but admiring of the French 
revolution and communicates a sense of unity with France in his declaration that the revolution is 
146James Madison, James Madison to Jean Marie Roland, April 1793, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012915/. 
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guiding nations into the “one great family” they ought to be. Madison went on to declare that “the 
recitals of the act which you communicate contain the best comment on the great principle of 
humanity: and in proportion as they speak the magnanimity of the French nation.”  Madison’s 147
characterizing of the “recitals of the act” as containing the “best comment on the great principle of 
humanity” makes a universal and deeply principled claim that is almost entirely absent from his 
language surrounding Latin American revolutions. In fact, when Madison mentions a universal 
principle in the context of Latin American revolution, the principle is in connection with the United 
States rather than the revolting colonies, including his statement that “​altho’ there may be no danger 
of hostile consequences from the Recognising act, it is desirable that ​our​ Republic should stand fair 
in the eyes of the world, not only for its own sake, but for that of Republicanism itself.”  Here it is 148
the reputation of the United States, rather than the act of recognizing Latin America, which is 
republican whereas the French context involved the “great principle of humanity.” Clearly principles 
play a much stronger role in Madison’s perspective toward France in comparison to Latin America.  
In the same letter Madison went on to personalize his statements, saying that “for myself I 
feel these sentiments with all the force which that reflection can inspire; and I present them with 
peculiar satisfaction as a citizen of the U.S.”  Madison not only focuses on principles with a 149
specificity and praise that never enters his language about Latin America, but he also goes out of his 
way to connect them with his own feelings. Furthermore, in contrast to his Latin American letters, 
strategy is wholly absent from his letter to Roland despite there being a variety of contemporary 
strategic uncertainties which Roland might have been able to speak to. Madison’s reaction to the 
147Ibid.  
148James Madison,​ ​James Madison to James Monroe, 6 May 1822, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library 
of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, ​https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm018329/​. (My emphasis) 
149James Madison, James Madison to Jean Marie Roland, April 1793, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018,  https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012915/. 
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French Revolution was, therefore, markedly different than his reaction to Latin American 
revolutions, being less strategic, more principled, and generally more enthusiastic.  
Madison also believed that a certain perspective on the French Revolution was the correct 
one for an American citizen to hold. Writing to Jefferson a few weeks after his letter to Roland, 
Madison commented that Edmund Randolph’s “sentiments are right & firm on the French Revoln., 
and in other respects I discovered no symptoms of heresy.”  Madison not only describes the 150
sentiments as correct, but implies that were Randolph’s views divergent from what they should be, 
they would qualify as “heresy.” This word choice highlights that, for Madison, the French 
Revolution was a quasi-religious cause, thereby reinforcing the connection he makes between this 
revolution and its ‘higher principles.’ Madison expected that other Americans support the revolution 
with the same verve and purity as himself, an element completely lacking in his approach to Latin 
American revolutions. 
The contrast becomes most clear in Madison’s letter to Jefferson written in September of 
1793. This letter concerns American citizens’ reactions to the disagreeable actions of the French 
Minister to the United States, Edmond-Charles Genet. Here Madison writes:  
The only antidote for their poison [those who tried to use Genet to divide the U.S. and 
France] is to distinguish between the nation & its agent, between principles and events; and 
to impress the well meaning with the fact that the enemies of Prance & of Liberty are at 
work to lead them from their honorable connection with these into the arms and ultimately 
into the Government, of G.B.   151
 
While Madison does attribute a strategic effect to “their poison,” he also emphasizes the distinction 
between “principles and events” regarding the French Revolution. Here, Madison believed that the 
150James Madison, James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 22 July 1793, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 26 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012944/. 
151James Madison, James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Containing Resolutions on Franco - American Resolutions for 
Genet, 2 September 1793, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012963/. 
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principles were not only separate, but were more important than the events in question. In the case 
of the French Revolution, he prioritized principles over concrete events and advocated that others 
do the same.  
In response to American anger toward Genet, Madison felt obliged to compose a “train of 
ideas”  to help structure county meetings on the issue. In this composition, Madison used language 152
similar to some found in his discussion of Latin America, calling the French revolution a “severe & 
glorious contest in which it is now engaged for its own liberty” that “must be peculiarly interesting 
to the wishes, the friendship & the sympathy of the people of America.”  This language is in his 153
reactions to both revolutions, but Madison continued by saying that “all attempts which may be 
made in whatever form or disguise to alienate the good will of the people of America from the cause 
of liberty & repubn Govt in F. have a tendency to weaken ye affection to the free principles of ye 
own Govt, and manifest designs wch ought to be narrowly watched & seasonably countered.”  154
This passage presents the most crucial distinction between how Madison treats the French and Latin 
American revolutions. In the context of France, Madison directly references the cause of “repubn 
Govt” in a manner totally absent from his correspondence surrounding Latin American revolutions. 
However, Madison goes even further, directly tying the republican cause in France with the 
wellbeing of republican government in the United States. As opposed to the Latin American case, 
where Madison does not mention republican government and where the question of republicanism 
revolves solely around the United States, the dual republics of the U.S. and France are linked such 
that not supporting French republicanism is akin to not supporting U.S. republicanism. Indeed, 
Madison went on in the letter to emphasize that the United States and France are “mutually attached 
152Ibid.  
153Ibid.  
154Ibid.  
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to the cause of liberty” and that France is “an example that may open the eyes of all mankind to 
their natl & pol rights.”  This equitable mutualism Madison approaches the French revolution with 155
is nowhere to be found in his discussion of Latin American revolutions. Whereas Madison sees the 
United States as the focus of republican principles in the Latin American case and approaches those 
revolutions with a focus on U.S. strategic interests, the French revolution is a beacon of universal 
principles that ties the U.S. and France together. With this comparison, the degree to which strategic 
interest, as opposed to republican principles, guided Madison’s approach to Latin American 
revolution becomes clear.  
Why would Madison so vehemently support the republican cause of France, going out of his 
way to separate principles and events, and yet prioritize U.S. strategy so completely with regards to 
Latin American revolutions? While there were a variety of situational differences, the key difference 
becomes clear when Madison describes his thoughts on the Latin American population. Writing to 
Frances Wright about the question of abolition, Madison declared that certain “physical 
peculiarities” make the “incorporation”  of freed slaves into the white population impossible.  He 156
goes on to specify that “these peculiarities, it wd. seem are not of equal force in the South American 
States, owing in part perhaps to a former degradation produced by colonial vassalage, but principally 
to the lesser contrast of colours. The difference is not striking between that of many of the Spanish 
& Portuguese Creoles & that of many of the mixed breed.”  This comment reaches its full meaning 157
in connection to Madison’s answer to Jedidiah Morse’s question: “what is their [free blacks’] general 
character with respect to industry and order?” Madison responds that their character is “generally 
155Ibid.  
156James Madison,​ ​James Madison to Frances Wright, 1 September 1825, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm019655/. 
157Ibid.  
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idle and depraved; appearing to retain the bad qualities of the slaves with whom they continue to 
associate, without acquiring any of the good ones of the whites, from whom [they] continue 
separated by prejudices.”  Madison sees Latin America as a region populated predominantly by 158
persons who are not white, and also sees freed slaves as a population characterized by personal 
defects. As has already been stated, Latin American revolutions were deeply connected to 
emancipatory efforts so, when Madison looked south to Latin America, he saw a population that 
was not white and, therefore, a population whose character with regards to “industry and order” was 
questionable at best. This type of population might, in Madison’s mind, be wholly undeserving or 
incapable of self-government to the point where that prospect was not even worth mentioning.  
While racism might begin to explain why self-government played a lesser role in Madison’s 
views on Latin America, it does not fully explain why the strategic lens so completely replaced a 
principled viewpoint. Madison’s upbringing and position within the Virginian planter class provide a 
reason for this replacement. Madison spent his entire life as a slave owner, viewing persons of color 
through the lens of personal utility: how their existence might benefit himself. When Madison went 
to the Continental Congress he took his slave Billey with him but, after the convention wrote his 
father to declare that: 
On a view of all circumstances I have judged it most prudent not to force Billey back to Va. 
even if could be done….I am persuaded his mind is too thoroughly tainted to be a fit 
companion for fellow slaves in Virga….I do not expect to get near the worth of him; but 
cannot think of punishing him by transportation merely for coveting that liberty for which 
we have paid the price of so much blood, and have proclaimed so often to be the right, & 
worthy the pursuit, of every human being.  159
 
158James Madison, James Madison to Jedidiah Morse, 28 March 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, accessed 19 April 
2018, ​https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0020​.  
159James Madison, James Madison to James Madison Sr.​,​ 8 September 1783, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from 
the Library of Congress, accessed 19 April 2018, https://www.loc.gov/item/mjm012487/. 
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Madison believed it impossible to bring Billey back to Virginia, believed liberty was a right that all 
human beings deserved, and yet still sold Billey in Philadelphia despite a limited financial return. 
Even when he had the least to lose from freeing Billey and clear principled reasons for doing so, 
Madison still viewed him through a lens of personal utility, acting only upon what he could gain 
from Billey’s existence.  
Madison’s lifetime identity as a slaveholder, combined with this demonstration of his lens of 
personal utility in Billey’s case, suggest the reasons behind Madison’s strategic approach to Latin 
American revolution. When Madison looked south, he not only saw populations he considered “idle 
and depraved,”  but also saw populations of color who looked, to him, much like the slaves he had 160
lived his entire life viewing through this lens of utility.  Madison approached Latin American 161
revolutions with a focus on strategic self-interest because this was the same way he had always 
approached populations of color, wondering how they might be useful to him. The French 
population, being predominantly white, were a ‘good in themselves’ and so his support of their 
revolution was principled while the Latin American revolutions, with largely non-white populations, 
were a ‘means’ to Madison’s self-interested strategic ends. This analysis helps explain Madison’s 
focus on Latin American independence over representative government: independence lead to 
commerce and European exclusion from the Western hemisphere that benefited the United States 
and so was a principle strategically worth supporting while representative government, especially to a 
man who deeply mistrusted the ability of people to govern themselves (to say nothing of this ability 
in non-white populations) might be a strategic liability or, at the very least, a principle not worth 
focusing on in comparison to the more beneficial independence.  
160James Madison, James Madison to Jedidiah Morse, 28 March 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, accessed 19 April 
2018, ​https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-03-02-0020​.  
161Or who he imagined to look this way, having never traveled to Latin America.  
 
 
65 
 
Madison and Jefferson 
Madison, then, saw Latin American revolutions in a self-interested strategic manner, almost 
entirely unconcerned with the success or possibility of representative government in Latin America. 
This perspective is different than Jefferson’s, which included a great deal of speculation about 
representative government in Latin America. Jefferson doubted the ability of former Spanish 
colonial populations to effectively govern themselves, but was willing to overlook this doubt 
depending on the advantages this exception would have for the United States. Additionally, 
Jefferson’s position was tied with his desire to preserve the lucrative profits of slavery and his desire 
for territorial expansion. Like Jefferson, Madison’s position was influenced by the self-interest of the 
U.S. and his identity as a Virginia slaveholder, even if in a different way. While self-interest guided 
Jefferson’s principles and their application, outside of a few small references that constitute little 
more than a meaningless refrain in comparison to the French revolution, Madison approached Latin 
American revolution with very little concern for the prospects of representative government. Instead 
Madison focused almost exclusively on the strategic benefits and harms these revolutions might 
present for the United States. While it may have manifested differently, in Jefferson’s case 
undergirding his principled outlook, in Madison’s supplanting his principles for a strategic focus, the 
self-interest of the United States, focused on expansion, firmly guided how both figures approached 
Latin American revolution.  
Jefferson and Madison, articulator of the supposed principles of the United States and 
designer of the government to enact those principles, both approached Latin American revolutions 
not as an expansion of these principles, but as an opportunity for U.S. gain. Self interest, rather than 
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a commitment to representative government, provided the foundation for how these ‘founding 
fathers’ viewed Latin American revolution and their perspectives would, on​ ​October 17, 1823,  162
gain an importance beyond themselves.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162James Monroe, James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, accessed 23 April 
2018, ​https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3814​.  
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Chapter III-Monroe and his Doctrine 
The Monroe Doctrine has undergone a critical re-interpretation, with many accepting that it 
operated more as a geo-political document rather than being centered on principle. While certainly 
valid, to fully understand the significance of the Monroe Doctrine in United States’ history it must 
be analyzed in light of the ‘founding fathers’’ opinions regarding Latin American representative 
government and in conjunction with an examination not just of what the Monroe Doctrine was, but 
of what it was not. This reading makes clear that the American Creedal narrative would expect 
Monroe to choose a different path, while in reality the Monroe Doctrine was rooted in a denial of 
the importance of representative government in Latin America. 
* * * 
The Road to 1823 
There is a tendency to look back on United States history and see the progress of this 
country as inevitable; however until 1815 the very existence of the United States was consistently 
uncertain. In 1783, the United States won independence but that by no means meant the country 
was stable. Independence did not, for instance, mean that the union between the states was 
guaranteed and during the first decades of the country’s existence, its leaders spent a great deal of 
energy worrying that the union would split. After the Articles of Confederation proved inadequate, 
the drafting and ratification of a new constitution became the focus of the country’s leadership and 
it was not until 1790 that the last of the original colonies ratified the document. Even after 
ratification, westward expansion proved a divisive subject, especially with regard to slavery. Many of 
the original Atlantic states worried about the decline of their relative power as new states were 
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added.  With the new system of government still being adjusted in accordance to experience and 163
crisis, as Jefferson and Madison assumed the presidency the continued internal cohesion of the 
country was very much up for debate. This is not to mention the country’s finances which, after the 
accumulation of large war debts, were in dire straits.   
More worrying was the latent British threat. While the United States won the 1776 war, the 
final treaty was hardly in its favor. Britain never pulled back from its forts on the United States’ 
northwestern border. In fact, it used these forts to support Native American raids into U.S. territory.
 This, coupled with the continued harassment of U.S. shipping, highlights the United States’ 164
precarious situation. The British military was far superior to that of the United States and, while the 
United States had won the war, the possibility of a British re-incursion remained daunting in the 
minds of the founders.  
Britain was not, however, the only threat facing the U.S. The French revolution and U.S. 
refusal to pay its war debt led to the “quasi-war” with France between 1798 and 1800.  This 165
revolution and subsequent war distanced the United States from its earlier ally and put yet another 
strain on its cohesion and stability. The last years of the 18th century were anything but stable.  
The dawn of a new century did not, however, inaugurate a new existential certainty. It was 
only after the conclusion of the War of 1812, otherwise known as the Second War of Independence, 
that one could gain confidence in the future existence of the U.S. That this war is now known by 
this other name highlights that before 1815 the United States was threading the needle under the 
163Reginald Horsman, “Dimensions of an ‘Empire for Liberty’: Expansion and Republicanism, 1775-1825,” ​Journal of the 
Early Republic 9​, no. 1 (1989): 1-20.   
164François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” ​The American Historical 
Review 113, ​no. 3 (2008): 647-677.   
165Miranda Spieler, “Abolition and Reenslavement in the Caribbean: The Revolution in French Guiana,” in ​The French 
Revolution in Global Perspective​, eds. Suzanne Desan, Lynn Hunt, and William Nelson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2013), 138.  
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British threat and remained, in large part, an independent but highly economically integrated and 
diplomatically coerced piece in the British empire. The success of British troops in the war, including 
the burning of the U.S. Capitol, reveals that the existential uncertainty in the country’s early years 
was merited. However, at the conclusion of the war, Britain finally pulled back from its threatening 
position in the Northwest and the continuance of the United States began to seem more certain. 
While the Treaty of Ghent would continue to be debated between the two nations, Monroe’s speech 
in 1823 notes the ongoing negotiations over the realized meaning and enforcement of the treaty, 
these disagreements would not spark a similarly dire conflict. After the war the United States 
fortified its coastline,  thereby decreasing the threat of foreign incursion.  166
This was the condition of the U.S. through Jefferson’s presidency and most of Madison’s. 
Burdened by debt, grappling with internal debates and political strife, and constantly threatened by 
British might and French military power, the United States had little ability to take proactive action, 
especially in the international sphere. Perhaps most importantly, the chaos resulting from the 
Napoleonic wars occupied a great deal of the U.S. government's attention. Jefferson’s embargo and 
its ensuing consequences, coupled with Madison’s War of 1812, left the United States responding to 
crises instead of taking additional foreign policy measures to influence the surrounding world. 
Jefferson and Madison assuredly had actions they would have taken had circumstances not forced 
their hands, but the energy of the United States government was preoccupied for much of the time 
the Virginia dynasty held power.  
The situation began to change with Monroe’s entrance into the presidency and the dawn of 
the 1820s. By this time internal cohesion had increased with the decline of the Federalist party, 
166James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message, 2 December 1823, The American Presidency Project, accessed 19 April 
2018, ​http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465​.  
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temporarily ending partisan strife and leading to this period’s denomination as the ‘Era of Good 
Feelings.’ Monroe’s speech in December 1823, in which he outlines what would later be named the 
Monroe Doctrine, provides an excellent picture of exactly how he and his administration saw the 
wellbeing of the country they presided over. Though Monroe’s speech outlines points of contention 
with Britain and Russia, there is no rhetoric describing a probable conflict and these disagreements 
were the subject of peaceful negotiations rather than increasing tensions. He stated that “the actual 
condition of the public finances more than realizes the favorable anticipations that were entertained 
of it at the opening of the last session of Congress” estimating that there would be a surplus of nine 
million dollars at the start of the new year.  Furthermore, Monroe said that “The state of the 167
Army….has now attained a high degree of perfection.”  Lastly, at the end of his speech Monroe 168
declared that “our population has expanded in every direction, and new States have been 
established….This expansion of our population and accession of new States to our Union have had 
the happiest effect on all its highest interests.”  After forty years of independence, the United 169
States was diplomatically, financially, militarily, and politically stable. This stability allowed for 
westward expansion and prosperity which, in turn, augmented the very stability that created it.  170
None of this is to say that there were not dilemmas or worries during this period, but that relative to 
the history preceding it, Monroe presided over a period of remarkable stability.  
167Ibid.  
168Ibid.  
169Ibid.  
170All of this stability was, however, limited to certain privileged segments of the population. Slaves, native peoples, and 
many other groups saw their lives constantly upended and characterized by suffering in the creation of this stability. 
While this suffering is not to be ignored, in this case I am attempting to access the national condition as perceived by 
figures who were, incontestably, the privileged and so this paragraph’s approach, while exclusionary, is analytically 
necessary to establish this particular critique of these individuals.  
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`As these broader strokes of U.S. history were playing out, the United States’ relationship 
with revolutionary South America remained somewhat stagnant. Jefferson’s presidency had 
established that, in the opinion of the United States, “Spain should be left in possession of her 
American colonies, since they could not be in better hands until the United States was ready to take 
those that it needed.”  While the United States looked covetously at its southern neighbors, it 171
lacked the capability to take decisive action on these impulses and its expansionism was relegated 
toward the acquisition of Florida and, eventually, the Louisiana Territory. The Latin American 
independence movements began at the very end of Jefferson’s presidency, leaving the responsibility 
of dealing with these movements with his friends, mentees, and successors: James Madison and 
James Monroe.  172
Madison’s ability to influence the situation in Latin America would be severely limited by the 
War of 1812. When he entered the presidency, Madison initially stuck to a strict policy of neutrality 
with regard to the southern revolutions. Whitaker discusses how Madison “held unofficial 
correspondence”  with the agents of revolution lobbying for support, while also permitting these 173
individuals to purchase “munitions”  to be shipped southward. This open policy to munitions sales 174
was extended to Spanish officials residing in America as well.  Though neutrality was Madison’s 175
position, the uncertain situation necessitated some response by the United States. What resulted is 
known as the “No Transfer Principle of 1811” which stated that the United States would not allow 
any territory in the Americas to pass from the hands of one colonial power to another. The 
171Arthur Whitaker, ​The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830​ (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1941), 32. 
172Aka: The Jameses  
173Ibid, 67. 
174Ibid, 67. 
175Ibid, 67.  
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statement declared that “a due regard to their own safety compels them [the United States] to 
provide under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory” and that this 
territory would be held “subject to a future negotiation.”  In his book ​No God But Gain​, Stephen 176
Chambers notes that this statement was one of the foundations for the establishment of the Monroe 
Doctrine twelve years later.   177
Although this was a bold statement, suggesting that Madison sought to take action focused 
on the Latin American revolutions, this effort was brought to a stop by the War of 1812 during 
which time the existential nature of the conflict prohibited the United States from taking such 
action.  Whitaker goes on to lay out the reasons for the “sacrifice” of the “interests of the United 178
States in Latin America….to its desire for territory.”  He writes both that Canada and Florida were 179
“contiguous with the United States” and “familiar” while Latin America was relatively unknown, far 
away, and seemed to be of less possible advantage to the United States. While the existential nature 
of the war easily explains the United States’ inaction in Latin America better than these reasons, the 
confluence of these factors meant that through the rest of Madison’s presidency the United States 
took little action to influence the southern conflicts.  
Monroe taking office, in combination with the end of the War of 1812 and the start of the 
period of relative stability described earlier in this chapter, led to more definitive action culminating 
in the decision to put forward the Monroe Doctrine. In his traditional historiographic treatment of 
Monroe, Whitaker describes him as a “devout republican….[who] was fired by a missionary zeal for 
176U.S. Congress, No Transfer Resolution, 15 January 1811, San Diego State University, accessed 25 April 2018, 
https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/No_Transfer_Resolution.pdf​.  
177Stephen Chambers, ​No God but Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe Doctrine & the Making of the United States 
(London: Verso, 2017), 118.  
178Arthur Whitaker, ​The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830​ (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1941), 95. 
179Ibid, 95-96.  
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propagating the republican faith in foreign parts.”  Whitaker’s view of Monroe will be subject to 180
critique later on in this chapter, suffice it to say that for all his “zeal,” Monroe had a limited view of 
Latin American liberty. Writing to Andrew Jackson in 1818, Monroe declared that “​by keeping the 
Allies out of the quarrel, ​Florida must soon be ours and ​the Colonies must be independent, for if they cannot 
beat Spain, they do not deserve to be free.​”  In addition to his clear focus on the self-interest of the 181
United States, in this case pertaining to the acquisition of Florida, Monroe also mirror’s Jefferson’s 
opinion that to deserve freedom Latin America had to succeed in military conflict. Monroe, 
therefore, did not consider it the job of the United States to interfere in this conflict, believing that 
independence and representative government had to be earned through self-reliant bloodshed.   182
If bloodshed was how freedom was earned, it would be earned with, and resisted by, 
weapons and munitions of U.S. manufacture. While the United States would not send its own forces 
into the conflict, it was also unwilling to cease its business with Spanish forces. Whitaker notes that 
Monroe believed selling weapons to Spain, as well as to the Spanish American colonies, was the only 
way to maintain neutrality and not “court….war….and ruin to the Spanish American cause.”  183
While this may have been the case, it was also the case that the United States was making a good 
deal of money selling weapons and supplies to both sides of the conflict, a reality that Latin America 
would not forget once its independence was achieved and the United States sought to reposition 
itself as an ever-present supporter of the revolutionary cause.  
Part of this positioning involved, in 1822, U.S. diplomatic recognition of the new Latin 
American states as independent and sovereign. While Monroe attempted to collaborate with Britain 
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on joint recognition, in the end he recognized these nations unilaterally although how he went about 
this recognition is telling. Whitaker himself remarks that “the national interest, not political idealism, 
was the mainspring of that policy.”  He reaches this conclusion as a result of Monroe’s initially 184
sending a U.S. minister only to Mexico, finding this surprising due to the newness and monarchical 
character of the Mexican state. Whitaker goes on to say that Monroe believed that all American 
states would eventually become republican and that Monroe hoped this would render his action less 
offensive to the European powers.  Regardless of the validity of this statement, with this maneuver 185
Monroe devalued representative government as a metric upon which United States policy would be 
based.  
The debate and path toward diplomatic recognition was long, however after this was 
achieved Monroe began searching for another action the United States could take. Whitaker writes 
that Monroe’s letters show “he was suffering keenly from the feeling that his administration lacked 
popular support and that he attributed this lack to the absence of any great and pressing issue, 
foreign or domestic, to focus public sentiment.”  Post-recognition, with a newly secure nation, and 186
having achieved a longstanding goal of many Latin American advocates, Monroe now had a free 
hand to take additional action to fire up public sentiment and, as will be shown, re-trench and 
forward his and his predecessors’ long standing goals. 
The Decision 
The Monroe Doctrine was not the action the American Creedal narrative would lead one to 
expect. Given the narrative’s focus on the spread of representative government abroad, the 
self-interested and expansionist tint to the Monroe Doctrine directly contradicts this version of 
184 Ibid, 378-379. 
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history. To understand this, one must look at the actions the United States did not take in 
conjunction with, or in the place of, the Monroe Doctrine but which were open to it at the time, 
given the strategic opening Monroe clearly knew he had and which this section will describe.  
After communicating the core aspect of his doctrine, Monroe stated that “In the war 
between those new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their 
recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere.”  Monroe’s Doctrine did 187
not alter U.S. neutrality, and here Monroe specifically rejects such an alteration which would have, in 
practice, led the United States to support its republican neighbors in their fight against Spanish 
monarchy. This neutrality was not restricted to the avoidance of war for, as was stated earlier in this 
chapter, part of Monroe’s neutrality entailed selling weapons to both sides of the conflict. Even as 
Monroe declared the Americas free of additional European intrusion, he was allowing the sale of 
weapons to a European power bent on an intrusion that, while outside of the bounds of the 
doctrine, clearly went against his principle of an American system based on representative 
government. Spain was in no position to pose a significant threat to the United State, nevertheless 
Monroe made no moves to end a neutrality that was, ostensibly, based around this non-existent 
threat and the wellbeing of the Latin American states which were striving for independence against 
the flow of U.S. bullets.  
Additionally, Monroe rejected all possibilities of alliances with the newly independent states. 
Whitaker writes that “The idea that the American system was to be implemented by the negotiation 
of inter-American alliances was a natural inference from Monroe’s message.”  Indeed, after the 188
187James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message, 2 December 1823, The American Presidency Project, accessed 19 April 
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1823 speech Columbia's minister in Washington, José María Salazar wrote to John Quincy Adams 
asking how the United States would resist European interference, if the U.S. would enter into a 
defensive alliance with Columbia, and if Spanish forces qualified as the kind of interference 
Monroe’s address focused on?  After a cabinet meeting, the administration’s reply was sent which, 189
among other things, downplayed the European threat and emphasized that should the doctrine be 
violated, the United States was not obliged to go to war for it could only do so with Congressional 
approval.  Beyond these qualifications, the response also “showed that the traditional opposition 190
against entangling alliances had been carried over into the new Latin American policy.”  Whitaker 191
goes on to note that Monroe “had never said that his system included cooperation with the new 
states….Now that the threat from Europe was no longer causing great uneasiness at Washington, 
the chief care of the administration was to avoid involvements with the new states that might prove 
embarrassing at a later period.”  Rather than engaging in a robust defense of representative 192
government through a system of alliances that his doctrine led Latin American states to infer and 
propose, Monroe’s administration distinctly avoided this path. There was not, however, much 
reason for doing so because though Washington’s farewell address emphasized the avoidance of 
alliances in an era of European colonization, Monroe’s American system created a new space where 
these alliances might have proved advantageous. Instead, Monroe refused these alliances based on 
nebulous future complications.  
These were a few of the other paths open to Monroe in the later part of 1823. Some, like 
alterations to neutrality, were enthusiastically advocated for by members of Congress while others, 
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like alliances, were put forward by the newly recognized Latin American nations themselves. 
Nevertheless, in the end Monroe chose to put forward the doctrine for which he is now famous. 
There is strong reason to believe these paths were open to Monroe due to the circumstances from 
which his doctrine emerged. These circumstances and the process by which Monroe came to his 
ultimate decision will be the subject of the remainder of this section.  
The Monroe Doctrine was put forward after many years of hesitation on the part of the 
United States. Indeed, in the lead up to recognition, Monroe wrote to Jonathan Russell that “the 
object is to serve the provinces essentially, by promoting the independence of all, with the 
establishment of free Republican Governments, and with that view, to obtain their recognition by 
other powers, as soon as possible. If we alarm these powers, we may defeat our own objects.”  193
Here Monroe was clearly concerned with how the European powers might react to U.S. action, and 
yet a year and a half later Monroe would put forward his doctrine banning future European 
colonization and systemic expansion in the Americas. Monroe’s nervousness in March 1822 
contrasts with the brashness of the Monroe Doctrine. Where in 1822 he formalized a long 
contemplated action, in 1823 Monroe leapt forward leading one to wonder why he felt comfortable 
taking this action. 
The Monroe Doctrine was not, in fact, sparked by Monroe or his administration but instead 
was a mutation of a proposal made by George Canning, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to 
the U.S. emissary to Britain, Richard Rush.  In 1823, Canning suggested that the United States and 194
Britain issue a joint declaration to warn “the European powers not to attempt the reconquest of 
Spanish America or the transfer of any part of it from Spain to another power.”  The proposal also 195
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contained a clause forbidding Britain and the United States from taking portions of Spanish America 
for themselves. Unable to agree to the proposal himself, Rush sent word of the opportunity to 
Monroe whose first step was to send letters to both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison asking 
for their opinions on the matter.  As Whitaker notes, the administrations of these three individuals 196
overlap with the entirety of the Latin American independence movements making this moment a 
coming together not only of the Virginia Dynasty, but of the entire U.S. approach to the possibility 
of Latin American independence and representative government.  197
Jefferson’s letter, which has been analyzed earlier in this paper, noted that “this sets our 
compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us.”  198
Jefferson clearly sees Monroe’s decision in this moment as fortuitous of the future course of the 
nation he helped to found, and as such had a great deal to say in the matter. Jefferson wrote that 
“our endeavour should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, 
could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it….with her on 
our side we need not fear the whole world.”  Jefferson accurately portrays how meaningful 199
Canning’s proposal was, for it signalled a moment when U.S. action to separate the American sphere 
from European influence was agreeable to the nation most able to usurp and resist such a 
separation. This, in Jefferson’s words, presented a great opportunity for freedom.  
However, as the first chapter of this project demonstrated, while Jefferson’s rhetoric may 
have revolved around freedom, self-interest was the actual foundation upon which his politics were 
built and this is clear in his letter to Monroe. First, Jefferson said that “its object [of the proposition] 
196Ibid, 456. 
197Ibid, 456. 
198Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 October 1823​, ​letter printed in Merrill Peterson, ed. 
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is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of ​our​ land all foreign powers, of 
never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of ​our​ nations.”  Jefferson’s 200
possessive language here is telling, for although Canning’s proposal forbade U.S. acquisition of 
Spanish American territory, Jefferson speaks of “our land” and “our nations.” These phrases 
indicate that while he speaks of hemispheric freedom, Jefferson views the entirety of the hemisphere 
as subject to the leadership of the United States and collaboration with Canning was a means to 
legitimize and secure this leadership. After all, what could legitimize U.S. hemispheric leadership 
more than its recognition by Britain, the nation to whom many Latin American nations already 
looked for protection and commercial prosperity.  201
Furthermore, Jefferson’s only qualm with the arrangement is revealed in his advice that “we 
have first to ask ourselves a question. Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or 
more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess, that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most 
interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States.  While unstated, Jefferson’s 202
interest in Cuba was assuredly based in the vast wealth which the United States could gain through 
ownership of the island and the lucrative slave-based plantation system that scholars have termed an 
“agro-industrial graveyard.”  In spite of his statement that Monroe’s question was “the most 203
momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence,”  204
Jefferson paused to contemplate the loss of the potential ownership of Cuba and its brutal slave 
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economy. This, in and of itself, is telling of Jefferson’s approach to the trade off between liberty and 
profit, but in the end Jefferson recommended that Monroe go along with Canning’s proposal.  
Similar to Jefferson, Madison’s response mirrors the pre-existing pattern of his thoughts on 
Latin America, in which strategy trumps principle. Noting the same advantage to cooperation which 
Jefferson pointed out, Madison declared that: 
The professions we have made to these neighbours, our sympathies with their liberties & 
independence, the deep interest we have in the most friendly relations with them, and the 
consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great Powers 
confederated agst. the rights & reforms, of which we have given so conspicuous & 
persuasive an example, all unite in calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade.  205
 
Just as he had throughout his writings on this subject, Madison starts with a focus on “these 
neighbors” before moving on to the strategic threat the Great Powers could pose to the United 
States if they commanded the resources of Latin America. While Jefferson emphasized the 
momentousness of the occasion but in the end based his hesitations and justifications in U.S. self 
interest, for Madison the question was firmly one of interest. This interest guided him, like Jefferson, 
to advise Monroe to agree to the declaration provided an eye was kept on constitutional adherence. 
However, before ending his letter Madison had one last question. He wrote asking “What is the 
extent of Mr. Canning's disclaimer as to ‘the remaining possessions of Spain in America?’ Does it 
exclude future views of acquiring Porto Rico &c, as well as Cuba? It leaves G. Britain free as I 
understand it in relation to other Quarters of the Globe.”  Focusing on Cuba like Jefferson had six 206
days earlier, Madison wonders whether there might be a way for the United States to make this 
declaration and still expand into Cuba. It was assuredly for the same reasons.  
205James Madison, James Madison to James Monroe,​ ​30 October 1823, Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the 
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Monroe received these letters of advice from his fellow Virginia plantation owners and 
promptly submitted them to his cabinet at the start of the meetings that would culminate in the 
Monroe Doctrine. The significance of this cannot be overstated. While they might not have been in 
the room, Jefferson and Madison’s opinions and biases were certainly present and held the full 
weight of their former-presidential and already semi-mythological statuses. These letters, like their 
authors, focused on the self-interest of the United States and so Monroe and his cabinet could move 
toward a self-interested approach with the support of the author of the Declaration of 
Independence and the ‘father of the constitution.’ This validation cannot be causally linked to 
Monroe’s decision, but a careful examination of the Monroe Doctrine will reveal that it did 
correspond to many of the patterns found in Jefferson and Madison’s thoughts on Latin American 
republicanism, which they communicated to Monroe in these letters and, assuredly, in prior 
conversations.  
Importantly, the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement rather than a bilateral one, with 
the United States acting alone, without the cooperation of Britain or its navy. Accounts on exactly 
why this is differ: with Whitaker arguing that Canning soured on the action he had proposed and 
Chambers arguing that Monroe abandoned the prospect of a joint statement himself. Regardless of 
the reason, Monroe makes his statement on behalf of the United States alone.  
This statement, presented in his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823, 
contains, as Arthur Whitaker points out, two parts: “the negative principle of non-colonization and 
the positive principle of the American system” in addition to a warning to Europe not to violate 
these principles.  On non-colonization, Monroe declared that: 207
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The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and 
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and 
independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.  208
 
Similar to Jefferson’s general approach to the Latin American question, Monroe’s language presents 
a ‘principle’ that is firmly rooted in U.S. self interest. Monroe bases this “principle” not on the 
well-being of a continent of newly free persons, but on the “rights and interests of the United 
States.” The importance of this approach becomes clear with the ending of this sentence, in which 
“future colonization ​by any European powers​” is prohibited. As many scholars have noted, this 
prohibition avoids restricting the possibility for future U.S. colonization in the Americas. While 
Canning’s proposal would have restricted this, Monroe’s statement maintains an opening for U.S. 
expansion. Nowhere in this section can the ‘grand moment for freedom’ that Jefferson described be 
found; the non-colonization principle is plainly and self-admittingly centered on the self interest of 
the United States.  
Principled language can, however, be found in the second section of the Monroe Doctrine 
which separates the “American system” from the “European system.” This is no coincidence for, as 
Whitaker points out, “from Jefferson’s reply he [Monroe] took the idea of an American system 
separate and distinct from the European system.”  Monroe said that: 209
The political system of the allied powers is essentially different….from that of 
America….We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between 
the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their 
part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and 
safety.  210
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This is the core of the Monroe Doctrine and what historians focus on most. That the contents of 
Jefferson’s letter made it into such an important passage confirms the collaboration in this moment. 
Continuing on the same theme, Monroe proclaimed that “we could not view any interposition for 
the purpose of oppressing them [free Latin American states], or controlling in any other manner 
their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly 
disposition toward the United States.”  This statement has often been read as based on the 211
principle of the two spheres which proceeded it, a reading which suggests that the difference 
between the two systems informs the meaning of “unfriendly disposition.” The reality is that any 
interference by European powers could constitute such a disposition for a host of other reasons. 
Looking south, Monroe and his predecessors saw the opportunity for U.S. commercial and 
territorial expansion and so any European action that might impede those prospects would, 
assuredly, fall under the category of an unfriendly disposition. This, in fact, is how the doctrine 
would be interpreted and utilized by U.S. leaders moving forward. Once again, what appears to be a 
statement of principle is, in fact, carefully built to leverage the veneer of principle on behalf of the 
self-interest of the United States.  
The exclusionary message the Monroe Doctrine communicated to the European powers 
indicates that, at this time, Monroe saw an opening for the United States to take dramatic action and 
he chose to do so for the United States’ own self-interest. Regardless of whether Canning or 
Monroe abandoned the joint proposal, in this proposal Monroe saw that Britain might tolerate 
unilateral U.S. action and, freed from the proclamation Britain had planned, he chose the path most 
advantageous to the United States and mimicked Britain’s proposal while leaving room for the 
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United States to expand and colonize throughout the Americas. Indeed, this alleviated the concern 
both Jefferson and Madison had that the joint-proclamation would prevent the United States from 
acquiring Cuba. The Doctrine’s construction was, therefore, firmly based in self-interest and this 
conclusion is backed up by a host of scholarship. Indeed, John Murrin states that “The zeal for 
expansion trumped a willingness to support other republics in the hemisphere. By the 1840s, if not 
earlier, the Monroe Doctrine had become a hegemonic text, far more than a statement of republican 
principle.”  Rather than being a statement of republican principle and allyship, the Monroe 212
Doctrine used the room the United States had to maneuver to its own distinct advantage.  
If Monroe had followed American Creedal expectations, he might have engaged in alliances 
with these other republican states, not sold weapons to their monarchical enemies, or at the very 
least not left so much room in his doctrine for U.S. colonizing action against them. Instead, he 
bucked his stated support to these republican states with the structure of his doctrine: both in what 
it did and in what it did not do. Jefferson and Madison, prioritizing U.S. interest over the republican 
cause and doubting the ability of Latin America to govern itself, wrote to advise Monroe on this 
path and so these roads not taken beg the question of why Monroe choose the path he did. What, 
exactly, was the purpose of his doctrine and why did it usurp the republican cause? 
The Realization of a Dream 
While many scholars have connected the self-interested aspects of the Monroe Doctrine to 
its purpose, this connection actually runs deeper than self-interest to link with the Virginia Dynasty’s 
vision of republicanism itself. Their goal of transforming the United States into an ever-expanding 
212John Murrin, “The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism,” ​Journal of the Early Republic 20, ​no. 1 (2000):  
22.  
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“Empire of Liberty” was the central motivator behind the Monroe Doctrine, and for them this goal 
was worth sacrificing the republican prospects in Latin America.   
The purpose of the doctrine can be traced, in part, to Jefferson and Madison’s questions 
concerning Cuba in the replies they sent back to Monroe. Whether or not these questions proved 
crucial to Monroe’s decision making, in the end Monroe left a clear opening in his doctrine for the 
United States to take Cuba and whatever other American territory it coveted. Indeed, Monroe 
himself stated that “we ought if possible to incorporate it [Cuba] into our union.”  Why did Cuba 213
feature so prominently in the thoughts of all three actors? 
This question has largely been answered by Stephen Chambers in his book ​No God But Gain​. 
Chambers writes that “by this time [1808], North Americans had already established a de facto 
informal empire on the much closer Spanish island [of Cuba].”  With its plantations supplying the 214
world’s coffee and sugar additions, Cuban agro-industry was experiencing rapid growth and 
tremendous profit, all of which was dependent on the continuation of the slave trade due to the 
brutal labor conditions on the island. Chambers notes that “fully 25 percent (3.2 million) of all the 
enslaved Africans to arrive in the Americas were brought ​after ​the U.S. ban”  continuing to say that 215
“If coffee, sugar and specie unlocked the doors of European and Asian markets for U.S. capitalists, 
slave ships were their key. The modern system of global capitalism originated as a machine that ran 
on the engine of the slave trade.”  When Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, all plantations owners, 216
looked to Cuba they saw a lucrative system whose economic effects were critical to enabling the 
prosperity of the United States. This is why, when Monroe wrote to them, both Jefferson and 
213Stephen Chambers, ​No God but Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe Doctrine & the Making of the United States 
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Madison expressed concern over the enshrinement of Cuba’s separation from the U.S. under 
Canning’s system. 
This Cuban money provided an incredible benefit to the United States: the alleviation of its 
debt. Chambers writes that: 
The Spanish economist Javier Cuenca Esteban has calculated that from 1790 through 1811 
U.S. trade surpluses with Spanish colonies-primarily Cuba-offset 90 per cent of U.S. trade 
deficits with the rest of the world, which historian Linda Salvucci has suggested ‘went a long 
way toward reducing the international indebtedness of the young United States.’ U.S. 
policymakers were well aware that by 1800 the U.S.-Cuba trade and slave trade also 
represented a significant portion of total customs receipts, which were the lifeblood of 
government revenue.   217
 
U.S. connections to the Cuban slave economy were, therefore, extraordinarily important to its 
financial and economic stability. When Monroe remarked in his last address to Congress that the 
entirety of the United States’ public debt could be paid off in a decade,  he did so only because of 218
the favorable commerce with Cuba and the resulting government revenue. All Monroe’s plans for 
construction, fortification, and other government endeavors he outlined were also premised on this 
trade with Cuba. Jefferson and Madison’s focus on Cuba makes perfect sense in light of these facts: 
the growth of the United States was, in large part, entirely dependent on Cuban slavery.  
Chambers goes on to connect this illegal slave trade to the Monroe Doctrine itself. He writes 
that: 
The doctrine was crafted to protect the illegal slave trade and was entirely consistent with the 
existing anti-British pro-slavery foreign policy of the administration. It was, moreover, the 
next logical step in the incorporation of the apparatus of U.S. foreign policy into the private 
trade networks of elite Americans invested in Cuba….The ‘No Transfer Principle of 1811’ 
had now become a hemispheric, ‘status quo,’ non-annexation policy writ large.  219
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By warning European powers against playing an active role in the Americas, Monroe was 
proclaiming Cuba off limits to the ongoing British crusade to end the slave trade.  This policy 220
would also protect Brazil’s slave trade and help to insulate American slavery from foreign 
interference. This may be why Monroe refused alliances with Latin American states after his 1823 
speech; this refusal was part of a broader refusal to work alongside abolitionist actors. If the 
Americas were to be separated from Europe, this separation would be maintained by a state with an 
active stake in the continuation of slavery, the illicit slave trade, and the profits derived from them.  
This reasoning is evidenced by other parts of Monroe’s 1823 address. In that address he 
claims that “not one [U.S. ship] so employed [in the slave trade] has been discovered, and there is 
good reason to believe that our flag is now seldom, if at all, disgraced by that traffic.”  Monroe’s 221
statement only highlights the degree to which his administration and the U.S. government were 
uninterested in enforcing the ban on the slave trade. As Chambers points out, it was an open secret 
that Senator James D’Wolff was engaged in the illegal slave trade.  If Monroe had been searching 222
for U.S. slave ships, he assuredly could have found them. The fact that he did not highlights 
Chambers’ point about Monroe’s protection of the Cuban slave economy, passively, through 
non-enforcement, and actively, through the Monroe Doctrine.  
This protection was also deeply connected to the ongoing project of westward expansion. 
The government revenue collected from trade with Cuba allowed for, as Monroe himself suggested, 
“the extinguishment of the Indian title to large tracts of fertile territory” and “the acquisition of 
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Florida.”  The money gained from the U.S.-protected Cuban slave economy directly financed 223
government efforts to expand westward. Chambers also supports this connection, writing that “As 
Americans became intimately involved in every aspect of the Cuban slave regime—including the 
slave trade—they routed the profits north to back the development of the financial infrastructure of 
the United States and fund westward expansion.”  This was a vicious cycle: U.S. agricultural 224
surplus was shipped south to feed the Cuban slave population who were brought to the island by 
U.S. slavers, Cuban goods and money were then sent North to the United States where they, and the 
government revenue they created, helped enable the westward expansion that, in turn, resulted in 
more farmland and, therefore, more foodstuffs to send to Cuba. Monroe was not ignorant of this 
fact. Chambers notes that in “September 1816 General Jessup, a high-profile officer hailed for his 
recent military service, advised soon-to-be president James Monroe that ‘Cuba is, therefore, the key 
to all Western America, whether we consider it in a military, a commercial, or a political point of 
view.’”  When Monroe created his doctrine, he did so in full knowledge of the importance of Cuba 225
to U.S. westward expansion and of the possibility that British anti-slavery efforts might shut down 
this economic structure and expansion as a result.  
While protecting the Cuban slave-economy was part of how the Monroe Doctrine protected 
expansion, it also did so in other ways. Monroe’s non-colonization principle is located directly after 
his reference to a proposal by the Russian government for a negotiation of “the respective rights and 
interests of the two nations on the North West coast of this continent.”  Britain, Monroe notes, 226
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issued a similar request. This structure indicates that the Monroe Doctrine was meant to deter these 
governments from further expansion in the North West, thereby leaving more room for the U.S. 
Indeed, the connection between the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansion is reinforced later 
on in the speech when Monroe directly followed his doctrine of the two different systems by 
outlining the “new territory” that had “been acquired of vast extent.”  He went on to note that “by 227
enlarging the basis of our system increasing the number of States the system itself has been greatly 
strengthened in both its branches. Consolidation and disunion have thereby been rendered equally 
impracticable.”  The Monroe Doctrine was not only connected to the project of westward 228
expansion but, through this, to the internal cohesion and stability of the United States.  
Stephen Chambers’ analysis is extraordinarily useful, but it misses the depth to which the 
self-interested nature of the Monroe doctrine is connected to the project of the United States itself. 
While his portrayal of the “incorporation of the apparatus of U.S. foreign policy into the private 
trade networks of elite Americans invested in Cuba”  is accurate, it fails to grasp the connection 229
between the Monroe Doctrine and the ongoing project of the Virginia plantation class and its 
governing dynasty: Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.  
Properly understood, the Monroe Doctrine represented a distinct turn away from the 
ideology of extra-national republican growth. With the post 1815 stability and Canning’s proposal, 
Monroe saw an opportunity for the U.S. to take proactive and decisive action abroad but rather than 
leverage this moment to aid in the spread of representative government, he turned the energy the 
U.S. government previously spent on survival toward the longstanding Jeffersonian project of 
227Ibid.  
228Ibid.  
229Stephen Chambers, ​No God but Gain: The Untold Story of Cuban Slavery, the Monroe Doctrine & the Making of the United States 
(London: Verso, 2017), 118.  
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westward expansion. Jefferson imagined a sprawling agrarian republic and Monroe, having 
negotiated the Louisiana Purchase and attempted to negotiate the sale of Florida, had been 
instrumental in enacting that vision even before his presidency. John Murrin writes that Jefferson’s 
project centered around “indefinite continental expansionism….hegemony for the United States at 
least in North America, and perhaps in the whole western hemisphere, and a determination to 
accomplish these goals without building a centralized warmaking government.”  Murrin calls this 230
vision both “Jefferson’s ​Lebensraum​” and his “Malthusian diplomacy” going on to state that Jefferson 
“assumed that the new republic’s unlimited supply of food would make possible a maximum rate of 
expansion for the indefinite future and eventually take over Spain’s possessions.”  Murrin then 231
quotes Jefferson: “We should take care not to think it for the interest of that great continent to press 
too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My fear is that they are too 
feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to take it from them peice by 
peice.”  232
Jefferson’s vision for the United States was characterized by constant expansion, even into 
Latin America. The prospect of Latin American representative government held no sway in his mind 
because, to him, it simultaneously hindered his expansionist vision and was secondary to it. Indeed, 
Monroe’s statement directly after his doctrine that “Consolidation and disunion have thereby 
[through the addition of new states] been rendered equally impracticable” fits neatly into Jefferson’s 
expansionist project. Monroe saw the stability of the United States as directly tied to its expansion. 
This was also Madison’s view, whose constitutional design was famously premised on the viability 
230John Murrin, “The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism,” ​Journal of the Early Republic 20, ​no. 1 (2000): 
2. 
231Ibid, 10. 
232Ibid, 10. 
 
 
91 
and advantage of a large republic which, in hindsight, could easily be read as an argument for 
expansion.   
There was an even more insidious side to this project. Writing to Monroe in 1801, Jefferson 
declared that “it is impossible not to look forward to distant times, when our rapid multiplication 
will expand itself beyond those limits, & cover the whole northern, if not the southern, continent, 
with a people speaking the same language, governed in similar forms, & by similar laws; nore can we 
contemplate with satisfaction either blot or mixture on that surface.”  The “Empire of Liberty” 233
Jefferson envisioned was not only characterized by constant expansion, but also by complete 
uniformity, including racial uniformity. Jefferson’s language of dissatisfaction with a “mixture on 
that surface” subtextually alludes to concepts of racial mixture and “blot” points to a darker spot on 
an otherwise lighter whole. These cues further highlight why Monroe avoided alliances with Latin 
American states and why Madison treated Latin American republics so differently from European 
ones: there was no room for abolitionist and non-white republics on the hemisphere these 
individuals considered theirs. Murrin notes this when he writes that “The ‘Empire for liberty’ was 
for whites only. The twin goals of Indian removal and African colonization were essentially 
components of the project, at least in Jefferson’s imagination.”  Indeed, Jefferson, Madison, and 234
Monroe all supported African colonization and oversaw the large-scale removal of Native peoples 
from their land. The expansionist republic of the Virginia Dynasty was meant to be white, 
English-speaking, and politically uniform. 
These three ‘founding fathers’ stood united in their vision of this pure expansionist republic 
and they had a cumulative twenty four years in the presidency to realize their dream. Jefferson 
233Ibid, 11. 
234Ibid, 4. 
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bought the Louisiana Purchase with Monroe’s diplomatic assistance and the revolutions in Latin 
America created an opportunity for United States’ commercial and territorial expansion, but the War 
of 1812 put a halt to such considerations. After the war, the United States gained a stability that 
neither Jefferson nor, for the most part, Madison had the opportunity to take advantage of. Luckily 
their fellow Virginian, Monroe, succeeded Madison and was in place to continue to enact their 
collective vision with the benefit of stability. Monroe was waiting for an opening from which he 
could accelerate this enactment, in the same way Jefferson had with the Louisiana Purchase, and 
form his own legacy. So when Canning made his proposal, the opening presented itself. After this 
sign of British acceptance of the exclusion of European powers from the Americas, Monroe forged 
his own path and declared the Western Hemisphere off limits to European colonization and 
interference, thereby protecting the slave-based Cuban economic engine fueling western expansion 
while simultaneously acting to prevent European expansion from colliding with that of the United 
States.  
The Monroe Doctrine was a leap forward in a project that these individuals, and the Virginia 
plantation class more broadly, had been advancing since before independence. The Seven Years War 
began, in large part, because of the westward expansion of Virginia land speculators  into Native 235
American territory. The actions of these speculators sparked a world war which, in turn, led Britain 
to restrict westward expansion with the Proclamation Line of 1763.  Thirteen years later due in 236
large part to the restrictions of this line, the colonies revolted, declared their independence, and 
established the United States whose mythology of freedom and governing framework would be 
235These speculators were looking for land to fuel the growth of the Virginia plantation economy, hence their connection 
with Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe.  
236Woody Holton, “Land Speculators versus Indians and the Privy Council,” in ​Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and 
the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia, ​(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999): 3-38.  
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created, in large part, by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison respectively. After Washington and 
Adams’ presidencies, these individuals finally controlled the government they had built and set about 
enacting their republican vision. Despite setbacks, in 1823 Monroe put forward his doctrine to make 
the Virginia Dynasty’s vision for eventual hemispheric domination by the ‘pure’ republican United 
States a reality. This doctrine would live on throughout the rest of the country’s history, enabling the 
use of republican rhetoric to justify intervention, expansion, and genocide exactly as intended.  
While the American Creedal narrative can excuse away certain aspects of the founders as 
‘imperfections’ in an otherwise righteous vision for the expansion of freedom, it cannot hold up to 
the reality that these ‘perfect’ political ideals were themselves deeply imperfect. The thoughts of 
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe on representative government, the heart of the American creed, 
were profoundly shaped by the self-interest of the United States and the expansionist and genocidal 
vision they sought to enact. They used the principle of representative government to justify aspects 
of their project, including the exclusion of European influence in the Monroe Doctrine, but this 
principle was never the compass for their actions. It was not that their greed, expansionism, and 
disregard for representative government outside the U.S. were aberrations from an otherwise 
admirable republican philosophy, but instead these ‘aberrations’ were integral to their core vision of 
representative government and its future. Furthermore, whenever they had the possibility to act, 
these individuals chose to abandon their “sister republics”  for this self-interested vision. When 237
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe looked southward, they saw an opportunity for representative 
government so long as it was theirs.  
 
 
 
237Caitlin Fitz, ​Our Sister Republics ​(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016), 248.  
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Conclusion-The Presence in the Past 
 
“A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from 
something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one 
pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in 
his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future 
to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.”  238
 
Walter Benjamin writes that to the angel of history, the past is not a chain of events, but 
rather one single catastrophe. Trouillot’s suggestion, that rather than just new facts we need a new 
narrative, is a call to open our eyes to this catastrophe. The American creedal narrative is “the storm 
[that] we call progress.” It says the United States has been on the path of improvement, striving to 
live up to its ‘founding ideals,’ and pulls us into the future. But the history of the United States is not 
a chain of events in which the harms of the past are separable from these ideals. Rather, it is a 
catastrophe that stretches back before independence, the roots of which are integral to 
republicanism itself. 
This integral relationship is core to what the previous chapters have attempted to 
demonstrate. When historians and political scientists separate the ‘founding’ of the United States 
from the ensuing history, especially the period during which the founders governed, they limit 
themselves to a partial view of republicanism. In order to gain a fuller view, the lens of investigation 
must be widened to encompass the years after the founding in which the meaning of republicanism 
was extrapolated. The views of Jefferson and Madison on Latin America, and their further 
incarnation in the Monroe Doctrine, were a part of the continuing codification of founding 
238Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in ​Illuminations​, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 257-258.  
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republicanism. Just as the protection of slavery and expansionism were core to the Monroe 
Doctrine, so too were they core to the founders’ republican vision. When they looked south, they 
saw a population whose struggle toward republicanism was not worthy of assistance, especially not 
at the cost of their domestic vision. Given the opportunity to enact the kind of universalist 
republican change the American creedal narrative would expect, these figures not only abandoned 
that action but declared their abandonment ‘for the sake of Republicanism itself.’ By the founders’ 
own admission this was not a divergence from the United States’ principles but was in accordance 
with the real founding principles of the United States which they leave unsaid: expansionism and 
greed.  
This evidence demands a reinterpretation of what ‘republicanism’ meant for these ‘founding 
fathers’ and, through them, what it means as a foundation for the United States. Doctrinal 
republicanism, the republicanism of the American creedal narrative, is characterized both by 
universalism, the idea that the U.S. was an example of a republicanism that could spread throughout 
the world, and by the juxtaposition between the public good and self-interest. This is why Gordon 
Wood in “Interests and Disinterestedness” notes the volatile nature of being labeled as an 
‘interested’ politician: to be interested was akin to not being a devout republican.  The validity of 239
this universalism and this public good/self-interest juxtaposition as central tenets to founding 
republicanism falls away when the scope of investigation is widened to the early republic and 
republicanism as a theory and practice of rule is taken seriously. What emerges from this 
investigation is an image of the United States as less of an exemplar “city on a hill”  and more of a 240
239Gordon Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness,” in ​Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National 
Identity, ​ed. Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward Carter II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1987), 98. 
240John Winthrop, “Dreams of a City on a Hill,” 1630, The American Yawp Reader, accessed 27 April 2018, 
http://www.americanyawp.com/reader/colliding-cultures/john-winthrop-dreams-of-a-city-on-a-hill-1630/  
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chosen people in a quasi-theological sense. To the founders, as the ‘first republic’ the interest of the 
United States maintained hierarchical dominance in their definition of republicanism. Representative 
government could spread to Latin America, but the principle of republicanism would only apply if 
this spread was consistent with the perceived interests of the United States which, in most cases, 
involved slavery and territorial expansion.  
We see this pattern not only in their language, but in their actions. As Haiti revolted and 
became a free republic, this revolution troubled the slave-based interests of United States and so the 
revolution was condemned and its republican connection was denied. ,  However, when Madison 241 242
was annexing West Florida he not only saw his actions as in accordance with republicanism, but 
manipulated the situation so that the self-determination based republican justification for U.S. 
annexation was more prominent.   243
U.S. republicanism cannot be characterized by the dichotomy between self-interest and the 
public good. While this dichotomy may have structured domestic U.S. politics as Wood outlines, 
globally the founders saw the republican public good and the self-interest of the United States as 
essentially the same. Anything that promoted the expansion and through this the interest of the ‘first 
republic’ was justified as republican in nature. The U.S. was a “city on a hill” not in the sense that 
others would eventually ascend to its level, but in the sense that it was ‘a city above all other cities.’ 
To the founders, the U.S. and the white citizens who inhabited it were a chosen people and this gave 
them supremacy over other republican populations. It was not that other places could not become 
241Indeed, much of the response surrounded the harms the Haitian revolution would bring to the interests of the United 
States. Jefferson notes his concern that Haitian revolutionary violence would spread into the southern part of the United 
States. 
242Donald Hickey, “America’s Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806,” ​Journal of the Early Republic 2​, no. 4 
(1982): 368.  
243William Belko, “The Origins of the Monroe Doctrine Revisited: The Madison Administration, the West Florida 
Revolt, and the No Transfer Policy,” ​The Florida Historical Quarterly 90, ​no. 2 (2011): 157-192.  
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republican, but that they would always be less republican than the U.S., especially if they were not 
white. Rather than being an independent ideal with its own definition of good, the core idea of 
founding republicanism was that the U.S. good was equitable to the republican good. The American 
creedal narrative uses republican ideals to justify U.S. exceptionalism but this is mistaken: the 
founders’ notion of the U.S. as exceptional is exactly what makes it unexceptional.  
This self-centered worldview directly contributed to the catastrophe of U.S. history. The 
Monroe Doctrine was the culmination of the Virginia Dynasty’s project, combining ‘principled 
rhetoric’ with the expansionist reality of those principles. However, Monroe and the United States 
were still limited by the realities of their time. While powerful, the United States was still a new 
country, lacking the capability to fully realize its interventionist and expansionist potential. What is 
significant about this history is that it set up a culture of expansionism and growth rooted in the 
belief that because the republican good was defined by U.S. interest, furthering this interest was 
always principally just. The Virginia Dynasty never travelled West, living on the coast and returning 
to Europe rather than venturing deeper into the American continent. When Jefferson envisioned the 
future of the United States, he saw a country of small-scale agrarianism rather than rampaging 
finance, burgeoning capitalism, and the Cotton Kingdom. He and his compatriots might not have 
foreseen this world, but we should not mistake their hand in creating it.  
Given this creation, at the level of ideas the divide between the ‘founding fathers’ and the 
post-Jacksonian U.S. is probably smaller than most historians believe. Jackson and the presidents 
that followed were more strongly oriented Westward, but their vision was not restricted to small 
scale agrarianism and so Manifest Destiny became the United States' governing dynamic. When Polk 
re-articulated the Monroe Doctrine and called for further expansion culminating in the Mexican 
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American war and the annexation of the North-American West,  he did so using the tools the 244
founders had left for him. At this point historians acknowledge that the Monroe Doctrine was one 
of these tools, created with expansionist openings and ambitions, but republicanism was another. It 
defined the principled lens which the U.S. government would use to justify its power and through 
which the U.S. populace would come see themselves. These trends were made viable in part by the 
centrality of expansionism and racial prejudice to the republican philosophy. Jefferson, Madison, and 
Monroe may not have had the opportunity to annex the far-west, intervene in Cuba, nor dictate 
politics in central-America, but the republican ideology they created was there for the leaders with 
those opportunities. 
Seen from this perspective, the foundations that guide U.S. hegemonic power extend farther 
back than many presume. The pre-independence Virginian project of westward expansion guided 
the republican principles that would be harnessed by the Monroe Doctrine and future U.S. leaders. 
U.S. hegemony was not a diversion from the founding ideals, but was completely in line with these 
ideals as they were further defined by the founders during their years in office and subsequent 
correspondence. The legacy of this dynamic is visible even in this century, especially with President 
Bush’s democratic justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With the end of the frontier, these 
principled tools now justify U.S. action on a global scale.  The exact course of history might differ 245
from the vision of the founders, but it was a history built using their principled mechanisms.  
This is no chain of events, it is a single catastrophe. With republicanism at its beck and call, 
the expansionist engine fueled the radical growth of Cotton Kingdom slavery in the south and the 
genocide of Native peoples to the west, the legacies of which still haunt the present. Next, the 
244James Polk, First Annual Address, 2 December 1845, The American Presidency Project, accessed 22 April 2018, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29486​.  
245Jackson Lears, ​Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America 1877-1920​ (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009).   
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United States engaged in near constant intervention in Latin America, eventually intervening in other 
hemispheres, but always drawing on the same republican ideology. These were not diversions from 
the creedal path of progress, they were actions built upon the legacy of the founding, a legacy 
constructed to enable this type of action. Benjamin writes that “there is no document of civilization 
which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of 
barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to 
another.”  The creedal narrative sees only the barbarism of transmission, remaining blind to the 246
barbarism of the document. In fact they are one and the same.   
This is only one new story, meant to challenge the creedal narrative that has become a kind 
of U.S. mythology. I am open to the possibility that this narrative might be wrong, though its core 
elements feel well founded. I am certain that the complexities of its full articulation have been 
missed in this project and the work of others will and already has begun filling in the gaps of this 
new story. Even as this vital work goes on, the American creedal narrative remains a key element in 
United States history, both in education and scholarship. In this position, the creedal narrative 
reinforces silences. It is imperative that we look through these silences, not only to deconstruct them 
as Trouillot does, but to weave a new history.  
There are many obstacles to this task, the first of which pertains to the archive itself. 
Trouillot’s analysis about the bias of the archive is well taken, but there are also basic problems with 
accessibility. Jefferson and Madison’s collected writings have been sorted by the Library of 
Congress, but no such work has been done for Monroe despite his importance. The more accessible 
these archives become, the less historians will forced to content ourselves with the ‘famous’ letters 
246 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in ​Illuminations​, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 256.  
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and addresses. This will allow other writings to be investigated and leveraged against those more 
accessible sources the creedal narrative has deemed important. If it structures the archive, as I am 
sure it does, the archive must be broadened not only to bring in a greater diversity of historical 
voices, but to challenge the creedal narrative itself. Finding additional, and more critical, analytical 
angles on powerful historical figures is one way to do this.  
Furthermore, the investigative lens has to shift to better encompass private correspondence. 
Today we are increasingly aware of the informal mechanisms through which power, and the elite 
that wield it, operate. Jefferson’s retirement letters to Monroe do not seem core to the republican 
ideology, but that is only because the creedal narrative says they are not. Jefferson’s words echoed 
even then with the authority of his position in history. Given that Jefferson helped found the United 
States with certain words, all his other words must be taken seriously as shedding light on the 
meaning of this founding. This project has shown the kind of perspective this light can reveal.  
At a deeper level, however, this historiographic silencing may be attributed to the artificial 
distinction between thought and action. Not only does the creedal narrative separate the founding 
from what came after it, but in doing so it draws this thought/action distinction. The 
thought-foundation of the U.S. remains moral despite the immoral actions of its thinkers. This is a 
distinction created by the creedal narrative for its own benefit. Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe 
presided over a republic they helped found; we should, therefore, take the periods of their 
governance as extended evidence of their founding vision. For example, Madison’s writing about the 
viability and advantage of large republics has become important to the literature on the founding 
and the U.S. political system. What this project reveals is that during and after his time in office, 
Madison concentrated on the expansion of the United States, making an already large republic even 
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larger. Perhaps, rather than a case for a large republic, Madison’s original argument was already 
looking forward to the expansion he and his Virginian companions would enable. Beginning to take 
the later thoughts and actions of the founders seriously, scholars can gain a new perspective on the 
original conception of the United States. Founding a country is not simply about establishing 
mechanisms of government, but is largely about creating a justification for the founding itself. The 
mythological history emerging from this justificatory moment must be juxtaposed and synthesized 
with what came afterwards.  
However, after these texts are uncovered and analyzed they cannot be pushed aside as an 
imperfection in an otherwise pure vision. To challenge the creedal narrative, the immoral aspects of 
history must be connected into a coherent whole. The racial vision of the Virginia dynasty was not 
separate from their expansionist aims nor their self-righteous perspectives; these all wound together 
in a twenty four year period during which time they influenced policy and cemented what U.S. 
governing norms would be. The creedal narrative succeeds by connecting certain dots while denying 
the connections of others. Better efforts must be made to fold morally questionable and 
uncomfortable elements of history back into the general narrative because it was through these 
immoral means that this general narrative was created.  
Additionally, silences must be sought out. The tricky thing about silences is that they go 
unnoticed if not searched for. Indeed, I only arrived at this project’s analysis of slavery after my 
advisor told me to look into the silences, to look into what Jefferson was not saying. One silence led 
me to another, and another. We have a duty to actively search for silences: to not let the archive 
restrict our thoughts, to keep in mind actions not taken in addition to those that were, and to always 
interrogate power where we find it. 
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To interrogate this power, we must not be afraid to judge those who wielded it. Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of “awakening the dead” is important, but in order for these awakened figures 
to hold their proper weight in history we must not only highlight the wrongs of the powerful, but 
also judge these wrongs and their enactors. Only when Thomas Jefferson is a greedy bastard can we 
fully reveal the self-interested nature of his republicanism and deconstruct its role in structuring our 
present society. The historian’s reticence surrounding judgement is understandable because for years 
their judgements worked to the benefit of power, oftentimes they still do. The problem with this 
reticence is that today it leaves the old constructed biases intact by toning down the histories that 
challenge these biases and the power they were built upon. As a discipline we should always be wary 
of how our judgements may play into biases and power structures, but our fear of this should not 
cripple us from making right the harms of the past, as historians and as citizens.  
Indeed, this work is more urgent than ever before. Trouillot writes that “we move closer to 
the era when professional historians will have to position themselves more clearly within the present, 
lest politicians, magnates, or ethic leaders alone write history for them.”  This sentiment echoes 247
Benjamin, who wrote that “For every image of the past that is not recognized by the present as one 
of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.”  The mythology of the creedal narrative 248
continues to apologize for the catastrophe of U.S. history, with all its inequalities and oppressions. 
In this moment, an image of the past shows itself as a concern of the present, the silences become 
ever so slightly audible, and it is our duty to form this history lest, once again, it disappears. Arendt 
writes that “no moral, individual and personal, standards of conduct will ever be able to excuse us 
from collective responsibility. This vicarious responsibility for things we have not done, this taking 
247Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 152.  
248Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in ​Illuminations​, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 255. 
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upon ourselves the consequences for things we are entirely innocent of, is the price we pay for the 
fact that we live our lives not by ourselves but among our fellowmen.”  To ignore this history, to 249
continue to write about the ‘founding ideals’ is not only to deny history, it is to deny our 
responsibility for that history. We might not have penned the words that justified genocide and 
expansionism, but we live in the world those words created and we have a responsibility to remedy 
the crimes of their past authors and present adherents. To enact this remedy, we must first 
acknowledge these crimes and their centrality to our political community. The American creedal 
narrative does more than silence, it excuses: asking ‘Why should we be responsible for the failure of 
our ancestors to live up to the ideals that we uphold?’ and declaring that ‘the core vision for our 
country has always been one of admirable principles.’ With these excuses the storm blows down 
from paradise and progress, the notion that U.S. history is one of slow but inevitable improvement, 
blinds us to the catastrophe of our history. This storm can make us feel comfortable, its illusion 
guarding us from the uncomfortable truth that we hold a collective responsibility for this 
catastrophe, but this illusion does nothing for all those who suffer because of our history nor does it 
remove from us our responsibility to these persons. Each day we live under this illusion we 
condemn its victims to further suffering and condemn ourselves as members of the community it 
founded.  
This responsibility is core to our duty to always remember the ​presence in the past​. I say 
presence because we need to remember both that the present holds its roots in the past and that the 
past has a presence today. In essence, we need to remember, as Benjamin claimed, that linear time is 
itself silencing because time flows both ways, weaving together the past and the present. Part of 
249Hannah Arendt, “Collective Responsibility,” in ​Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt​, ed. 
James Bernauer, (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 50.  
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acknowledging this means challenging the historically based myths and illusions that reside in this 
confluence of past and present. To do so is not to engage in Ranke’s project to show the past “as it 
essentially was,”  because a historian’s duty exists not to the past as a “separate world,”  but to 250 251
the presence in the past. This demands not simply a search for the truth, but a search for ​a​ truth that 
can serve the present by combatting silences, awakening the dead, and reevaluating the history of the 
powerful. Historians must take a greater stand on what their histories mean in order to challenge our 
readers to rethink the present in addition to the past. We are, and will forever remain, political 
actors. A lack of judgement or moral condemnation and an ignorance of this confluence of time are 
acts as political as their opposites. Whether we recognize it or not, the presence in the past will 
always be with us. We have a responsibility to make it just.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
250Leopold Von Ranke, quoted in Michael Novick, ​That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical 
Profession ​(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 28.  
251Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ​Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History​ (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 152.  
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